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Race and Equity in the Age of Unicorns
LYNNISE E. PHILLIPS PANTIN†
This Article critically examines startup culture and its legal predicates. The Article analyzes
innovation culture as a whole and uses the downfall of Theranos to illustrate the deficiencies in
Silicon Valley culture, centering on race and class. The Article demonstrates that the rise and fall
of the unicorn startup Theranos and its founder, Elizabeth Holmes, is emblematic of the problem
with the glorification and pursuit of the unicorn designation for startup ventures. The examination
of the downfall of Theranos exposes how investors, founders, and others in Silicon Valley engage
with each other in the context of pursuing unicorn status. The saga of Theranos lays bare how the
wealthy and the privileged control the private financial markets and underscores the structural
inequities within the startup ecosystem. Such a structure promotes certain types of entrepreneurs
to the exclusion of others. Diverse and nontraditional entrepreneurs in the startup world face
tremendous hurdles to securing financing, mentorship and media exposure. In stark contrast,
founders like Holmes benefit from a perception of worthiness drawn from factors such as race,
socioeconomic status, pedigree and social connections. This Article examines how the culture of
creating the next unicorn has ramifications beyond fraud and risk, but also socio-economic
consequences.

† Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This Article is based on a presentation given at the
ComplianceNet 2019 Conference on Business Ethics, at the Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law. It was presented at the 2019 Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop at New York University Law School
and the 2019 Biennial LatCrit Conference at the Georgia State University School of Law. I thank the facilitators
and participants at each workshop for their insightful comments and suggestions. For additional helpful
comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Deborah Archer, Alina Ball, Priya Baskaran, Stephanie
Charles, Jennifer Fan, Gautam Hans, Jennifer Olivas, Lauren Rogal, Colleen Shanahan, and Erika Wilson. For
truly exceptional research assistance, I thank Dola Adebayo and Anisha Mohin.
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INTRODUCTION
The holy grail for a startup is the achievement of the unicorn moniker: the
billion dollar valuation on the private market.1 Silicon Valley is ground zero for
the creation of a unicorn because of the number of influential investors,
innovators, and businesses in the region, which is home to thousands of startup
companies and the country’s largest technology corporations.2 The amount of
wealth in Silicon Valley is astounding. 3 Silicon Valley has multiple
definitions—the tangible geographic one, defined as the southern part of the San
Francisco Bay Area, and the metaphorical one that refers to the U.S. high tech
economic sector and other comparable sectors around the world. 4 The
geographic region accounts for nearly half of all the venture capital in the United
States. 5 Because of its influential investors and gatekeepers, the metaphoric
region represents a powerful private market for capital raises.6

1. The term “unicorn” was coined by Aileen Lee as a term for startups valued over $1 billion. Aileen Lee,
Welcome to the Unicorn Club: Learning from Billion-Dollar Startups, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2013, 11:00 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2013/11/02/welcome-to-the-unicorn-club. Market research firm CB Insights found that
there are now over 600 private companies valued at $1 billion. $1B+ Market Map: The World’s 600+ Unicorn
Companies in One Infographic, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/unicornstartup-market-map/.
2. See Shobhit Seth, Why Is Silicon Valley a Startup Heaven?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/061115/why-silicon-valley-startup-heaven.asp (June
25, 2019); see also Kimberly Amadeo, Silicon Valley, America’s Innovative Advantage, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-silicon-valley-3305808 (Nov. 27, 2020).
3. According to the Brookings Institute, the metropolitan area of San Jose, California, has the thirdhighest GDP per capita in the world (after Zurich, Switzerland, and Oslo, Norway). Gina Hall, San Jose Area
Has World’s Third-Highest GDP Per Capita, Brookings Says, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:34
PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/news/2015/01/23/san-jose-has-worlds-third-highest-gdp-percapita.html. According to the research institute Wealth-X, the percentage of “ultra high net worth individuals”
(assets worth at least $30 million) in the San Francisco Bay Area has continued to grow each year, with an
increase of 16.6% of ultra high net worth individuals between 2018 to 2019. WEALTH-X, WORLD ULTRA
WEALTH REPORT 2020, at 2 (2020), https://thehometrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Wealth-X_WorldUltra-Wealth-Report_2020.pdf.
4. Troy Segal, Silicon Valley, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/siliconvalley.asp
(Oct. 27, 2020); Silicon Valley, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/silicon-valley (last
visited May 21, 2021).
5. Richard Florida & Karen M. King, Spiky Venture Capital: The Geography of Venture Capital
Investment by Metro and Zip Code, MARTIN PROSPERITY INST. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www2.rotman.utoronto.ca/mpi/content/spiky-venture-capital/ (showing that San Francisco, California, accounts for
25.26% and San Jose, California, accounts for 14.51% of venture capital in the United States); Richard Florida,
The Extreme Geographic Inequality of High-Tech Venture Capital, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Mar. 27, 2018, 7:43
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-27/the-extreme-geographic-inequality-of-high-techventure-capital (“Silicon Valley . . . currently accounts for nearly 45 percent of total venture capital investment
in the entire United States.”).
6. Jim Yu, The Unforeseen Challenges of Raising Capital, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2013, 9:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2013/12/16/the-unforeseen-challenges-of-raising-capital/
#1e7c2a496989; see Ray Hennessey, Elitism Has No Place in Entrepreneurship, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 18,
2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/250831 (“[E]litism is found too often among entrepreneurs,
particularly in tech startups. The myopia, the drive that fuels people to take risks, often creates great companies
and great products, but it also cultivates a solipsism that assumes the work the entrepreneur is doing, and the
way in which that work is being done, is the only important undertaking in the world.”).
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The paradox of Silicon Valley is that it is a community built on the ideals
of pursuing innovation and of challenging the status quo, but in reality, the
practices and culture of Silicon Valley are stagnant in key ways that further
entrench the status quo. Further, Silicon Valley purports itself to be the ultimate
meritocracy, but in reality, the culture reproduces and reinforces racial and
gender inequities.7 In Silicon Valley, indeed, startup success tracks dominant
cultural norms found in larger society. While the ideas, inventions, and
companies purport to disrupt and innovate, the ecosystem of Silicon Valley
values dominant race and class-based indicators of success and worthiness to the
detriment of “nontraditional” and minority entrepreneurs. Examining the
decade-long fraud of Theranos with a critical lens, the company’s story provides
an example of the paradoxical values of Silicon Valley and their ultimate harm
to companies, investors, and customers.8 The Theranos saga demonstrates the
dysfunction and the systemic problems associated with the entrepreneurial
process. This Article describes the pervasive structural racism and inequality in
place that created an environment where a fraud of such magnitude was hidden
for so long.
Theranos, the former blood-testing technology company, is notable for its
meteoric rise, emblematic of the culture of creating a Silicon Valley unicorn
company, as well as its disastrous fall from grace.9 It is an unraveling that lost
investors’ money and endangered the health of its clients. The company garnered
attention because of its claims that its innovative and proprietary technology
could perform over 200 medical tests with a single drop of blood, at low cost,
thereby revolutionizing the medical industry.10 Given what is now known about
the massive fraud and deception, the unbelievable ten-year growth and financial

7. Safiya Umoja Noble & Sarah T. Roberts, Technological Elites, the Meritocracy, and Postracial Myths
in Silicon Valley, in RACISM POSTRACE 113 (Roopali Mukherjee, Sarah Banet-Weiser & Herman Gray eds.,
2019).
8. See Erin Griffith, Theranos and Silicon Valley’s ‘Fake It Till You Make It’ Culture, WIRED (Mar. 14,
2018, 3:12 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/theranos-and-silicon-valleys-fake-it-till-you-make-it-culture
(finding that in the so-called “age of unicorns,” startups can raise large sums of capital from private investors
and become sizable businesses without the scrutiny, onerous disclosures, and strict regulatory compliance of
being a public company).
9. “‘Unicorns’ are private companies with valuations of a billion dollars or more. As their name indicates,
unicorns were originally so rare as to be almost mythical.” Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure
and the New Private Economy, 57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 583 (2016). Theranos raised more than $700 million from
venture capitalists and private investors, resulting in a $10 billion valuation at its peak in 2013–2014. See Roger
Parloff, This CEO Is Out for Blood, FORTUNE (June 12, 2014, 4:37 AM), https://fortune.com/2014/06/
12/theranos-blood-holmes.
10. In fact, the two key pieces of the Theranos technology, the “Edison” and the “Minilab,” were found to
be unreliable. Lisa Eitel, Theranos—And the Satisfaction of How Engineering Doesn’t Lie, DESIGN WORLD (Apr.
23,
2019),
https://www.designworldonline.com/schadenfreude-for-theranos-and-satisfaction-in-howengineering-doesnt-lie/. It was discovered that rather than using its own technology, the company often relied
on the equipment of its competitor, Siemens, to perform certain blood tests. See id. Further, Theranos offered
lower prices than its competition not because of the low cost of its product, but because the company was burning
up cash raised from venture capitalists. See Zaw Thiha Tun, Theranos: A Fallen Unicorn, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/020116/theranos-fallen-unicorn.asp (Aug. 27, 2019).
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success of Theranos is worthy of a close examination. The story of Theranos’
rise demonstrates how structural, economic, and social forces play out in the
startup context to favor certain actors and reward certain behaviors, to the
detriment of others. In this Article, I suggest that such examination reveals the
structural bias and inequality that is woven into the current system of private
capital raising for startup entities. The broader impact of the revelation is that
seemingly more than any other factors, race, class, and education are strong
indicators of startup success. The story of Theranos, its founder Elizabeth
Holmes, its former company president Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, and the
company’s path to startup success reveals inequity rampant in the traditional
canons of how to achieve entrepreneurial success.
Elizabeth Holmes launched the blood-testing startup in Silicon Valley in
2003 at the age of nineteen.11 Beyond Theranos’ claims and mission, much was
made of Holmes as the young, “genius” founder of Theranos.12 This “rising star”
and “young genius” narrative is central to American legend making in business
and entrepreneurship.13 Historically, individual success and glory is celebrated
and canonized. 14 For example, many historical figures, often referred to as
robber barons, became wealthy through individual entrepreneurship efforts.15
Holmes made for a compelling founder. She was described as magnetic
with an inspiring, idealistic vision for her company.16 She is white and from an
affluent family. She was well-educated; she went to a well-known prep school
in Houston, Texas, 17 and after graduating, she matriculated to Stanford
University in 2002. 18 She dropped out of Stanford during the fall of her
sophomore year and used an education trust set up by her parents to start her

11. Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer, The Rise and Fall of Theranos, the Blood-Testing Startup That Went from
Silicon Valley Darling to Facing Fraud Charges, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2019, 8:55 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-history-of-silicon-valley-unicorn-theranos-and-ceo-elizabeth-holmes2018-5.
12. Avery Hartmans & Paige Leskin, The Rise and Fall of Elizabeth Holmes, the Theranos Founder Whose
Federal Fraud Trial Is Delayed Until 2021, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 11, 2020, 11:14 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-founder-ceo-elizabeth-holmes-life-story-bio-2018-4 (stating that
Holmes was hailed “as a genius who styled herself as a female Steve Jobs”).
13. See generally Yiren Lu, Silicon Valley’s Youth Problem, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 12, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/magazine/silicon-valleys-youth-problem.html (articulating the concern
about tech being “increasingly youth-fetishizing”).
14. See Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employee-walkout-labor.html (“For decades,
Silicon Valley has been ground zero for a vaguely utopian form of individualism—the idea that a single engineer
with a laptop and an internet connection could change the world, or at least a long-established industry.”).
15. See Gus Lubin, Michael B. Kelley & Rob Wile, Meet the 24 Robber Barons Who Once Ruled America,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:56 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/americas-robber-barons-2012-3.
16. JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VALLEY STARTUP 7, 151 (2018).
17. Reed Abelson & Julie Creswell, Theranos Founder Faces a Test of Technology, and Reputation, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/business/theranos-founder-faces-a-test-oftechnology-and-reputation.html.
18. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 12.
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company.19 At that time, the company was called Real Time Cures and it was
based on her idea to develop a wearable patch that could adjust the dosage of
drug delivery and notify doctors of variables in patients’ blood.20 She began
developing lab-on-a-chip technology for blood tests, changed the company
name to Theranos, a combination of the words “therapy” and “diagnosis,” and
pursued a new strategy for the company that would make testing cheaper, more
convenient, and accessible to consumers.21 Although she was heavily engaged
with chemical engineering classes while on campus at Stanford, she had no
medical or otherwise relevant scientific training. 22 Despite her lack of
experience, she was at the helm of a company that would go on to raise hundreds
of millions of dollars in private capital. Her rapid ascent is a racial reality
unheard of for entrepreneurs of color because entrepreneurs of color are not only
questioned with more rigor, but they typically have to demonstrate expertise and
a viable product in order to access capital, and they also are unlikely to have
trust funds to back them.23
Up until Holmes and her company were exposed as fraudulent in 2015, she
had clearly mastered fundraising in Silicon Valley. Successful and famous
venture capitalists, such as Tim Draper and Steve Jurvetson, founders of famed
venture capital firm, Draper Fisher Jurvetson, were early investors in
Theranos.24 Famed power brokers, such as the former Chairman of Oracle, Don
Lucas, and a former Secretary of State, George Shultz, were investors and served
on the Board.25 The endorsement of these notable kingmakers within Silicon
Valley’s ecosystem ensured that Holmes and Theranos gained the necessary
visibility and buzz essential for unicorn status.
As she built Theranos, and started to achieve success with investors,
Elizabeth Holmes was featured on the cover of multiple tech and industry
magazines. 26 The media described her as a bright young star in the male-

19. Caitlin Roper, This Woman Invented a Way to Run 30 Lab Tests on Only One Drop of Blood, WIRED
(Feb. 18, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/02/elizabeth-holmes-theranos/.
20. Megan Liscomb, Elizabeth Holmes: The Making of a Scam, FINANCE 101,
https://www.finance101.com/elizabeth-holmes/ (Nov. 10, 2020).
21. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 15.
22. Her chemical engineering professor, Channing Robertson, was a paid advisor to Theranos until 2012
when he gave up a tenured position and an endowed chair in Stanford’s engineering department to join Theranos
as an employee. See Tom Relihan, 4 Red Flags That Signaled Theranos’ Downfall, MIT SLOAN: IDEAS MADE
TO MATTER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/4-red-flags-signaled-theranosdownfall.
23. See Bärí A. Williams, I Can’t Wait for There to Be a Black Elizabeth Holmes, FAST CO. (Mar. 16,
2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40545503/i-cant-wait-for-there-to-be-a-black-elizabeth-holmes; see also
James Norman, A VC’s Guide to Investing in Black Founders, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 19, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/06/a-vcs-guide-to-investing-in-black-founders.
24. The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley (HBO documentary broadcast Mar. 18, 2019).
25. Roger Parloff, A Singular Board at Theranos, FORTUNE (June 12, 2014, 4:40 AM),
http://fortune.com/2014/06/12/theranos-board-directors.
26. Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, Elizabeth Holmes, Theranos C.E.O. and Silicon Valley Star, Accused
of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/health/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-
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dominated tech industry and some described her as “the next Steve Jobs.”27 A
professor of Holmes, Channing Robertson from Stanford’s engineering
department, described Holmes as “a once-in-a-generation genius,” comparing
her to Newton, Einstein, Mozart, and Leonardo da Vinci.28 Forbes Magazine
referred to her as “the youngest self-made woman billionaire.” 29 President
Obama appointed her to be a U.S. ambassador for global entrepreneurship, and
Harvard Medical School invited her to join their Board of Fellows. 30 The
extensive media attention helped propel her fundraising.31
Inevitably, the fictions of Theranos unraveled as former employees blew
the whistle and told their story to John Carreyrou, an investigative reporter for
the Wall Street Journal. Carreyrou wrote about the myriad of lies and
discrepancies at Theranos’ lab, resulting in regulatory, civil, and criminal actions
against Holmes and Balwani.32 In 2016, Theranos was sanctioned by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 33 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) accused the company, its founder and CEO, and its former
president of engaging in an elaborate fraud, alleging that Theranos, Holmes, and
Balwani had made false statements about the company’s technology, business,
and financial performance.34 Theranos and Holmes settled the SEC charge for
an amount of $500,000 in addition to other penalties.35 As of the writing of this
Article, the charges against Balwani have not been settled. In September 2018,
fraud.html (“[Holmes] became an overnight celebrity, featured on magazine covers and richest-woman lists and
in glowing articles.”).
27. Parloff, supra note 9 (providing a statement from Holmes’ former professor Channing Roberts) (“I
realized that I could have just as well been looking into the eyes of a Steve Jobs or a Bill Gates . . . .”).
28. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 211.
29. In 2015, at the age of thirty, Holmes debuted on the Forbes 400 List. See #435 Elizabeth Holmes,
FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/elizabeth-holmes/?sh=7b447be647a7 (last visited May 21, 2021).
30. Sarah Buhr, Elizabeth Holmes Quietly Stepped Down from Obama’s Business Ambassador Program,
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 2, 2016, 4:38 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/02/elizabeth-holmes-quietly-steppeddown-from-obamas-business-ambassador-program; Steve Tobak, After the Theranos Mess, Can We Finally Quit
Idolizing Entrepreneurs?, Fortune (May 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/05/27/quit-idolizingentrepreneurs/.
31. Press Release, SEC, Theranos, CEO Holmes, and Former President Balwani Charged with Massive
Fraud (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-41 (“The complaints allege that Theranos,
Holmes, and Balwani made numerous false and misleading statements in investor presentations, product
demonstrations, and media articles by which they deceived investors into believing that its key product—a
portable blood analyzer—could conduct comprehensive blood tests from finger drops of blood, revolutionizing
the blood testing industry.”).
32. In 2015, the Wall Street Journal published an investigative story raising doubts about the company’s
blood-testing technology and the veracity of its financial performance. See John Carreyrou, How Startup
Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Test Technology, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:20 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-tests-1444881901.
33. John Carreyrou, Michael Siconolfi & Christopher Weaver, Theranos Dealt Sharp Blow as Elizabeth
Holmes Is Banned from Operating Labs, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-sregulator-bans-theranos-ceo-elizabeth-holmes-from-operating-labs-for-two-years-1467956064.
34. Press Release, supra note 31. The SEC referred to Theranos as an “elaborate, years-long fraud” in
which Holmes and Balwani “exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business,
and financial performance.” Id.
35. Id.
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after defaulting on a $65 million loan, Theranos shut down operations.36 On June
15, 2018, Holmes and Balwani were indicted in federal court in the Northern
District of California for wire fraud and conspiracy.37 Holmes and Balwani are
awaiting trial on these wire fraud and conspiracy charges.
In the end, Theranos turned out to be a mule rather than a mythical unicorn.
In the wake of the company’s downfall and that of its founder, there are many
questions that remain, not the least of which is the question of how Holmes was
able to achieve the level of financial success that Theranos rested upon, without
the requisite due diligence and oversight from investors and regulators. Putting
aside the question of Elizabeth Holmes’ intent to defraud investors and her
Board, the story of Elizabeth Holmes’ rise and her route to success illustrates the
inequities inherent in the culture of the startup world. The story of Theranos,
“[a]t its root, [is] a parable that cuts to the central dysfunctions in the American
economic and political order, one that should dismantle our notions of
meritocracy and put a strict limit on our forbearance for elites.”38
The central premise of this Article is that the culture of creating a model
unicorn company in Silicon Valley seems to adhere and perpetuate the principle
that white, connected, and pedigreed founders are given primacy over others.
Elizabeth Holmes’ story is firmly rooted in, and is illustrative of, this culture.
She was able to raise astounding amounts of money from private investors, not
just because she had a great idea, but arguably because she was white, connected,
and had the right pedigree, consistent with the culture surrounding a unicorn
company. 39 Her story is not just a story of personal charisma or bias—it’s a story
of the structures of entrepreneurship in America.
This Article reveals the ways in which aspects of Theranos reflects the
larger structural problems within Silicon Valley, analyzing the structural
underpinnings that perpetuate the closed market, patronage system that largely
benefits white male entrepreneurs in particular. The two largest facets of this
system are a startup culture that rewards only a certain narrow category of
founders deemed “worthy” by the culture’s standards and restricted private
36. John Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:10 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/blood-testing-firm-theranos-to-dissolve-1536115130
(reporting
that,
on
September 4, 2018, Theranos announced in an email to investors that it would cease operations and release its
assets and remaining cash to creditors after all efforts to find a buyer came to nothing). At the time of the writing
of this Article, Holmes is awaiting trial on the wire fraud and conspiracy charges; however, the trial has been
delayed due to Holmes’ recent pregnancy announcement. Yasmin Khorram, Elizabeth Holmes Trial Pushed to
August Following Surprise Pregancy Announcement, CNBC (Mar. 17, 2021, 2:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2021/03/17/elizabeth-holmes-trial-pushed-to-august-after-surprise-pregnancy-announcement.html.
37. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Elizabeth Holmes Indicted on Wire Fraud Charges, Steps Down from Theranos,
CNN: BUS. (June 16, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/15/technology/elizabeth-holmesindicted-theranos/index.html.
38. Avi Asher-Schapiro, What the Theranos Documentary Misses, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://newrepublic.com/article/153419/theranos-documentary-misses.
39. See Sarah McBride, Insight: In Silicon Valley Start-Up World, Pedigree Counts, REUTERS (Sept. 12,
2013,
2:04
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-%20%20%20startup-connections-insightidUSBRE98B15U20130912.
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markets used by the elites to entrench their cultural norms. It is a culture that
does not necessarily reward based on merit. There is a philosophy of worth,
reflected in the cultural norms, and the private markets create a mechanism for
enforcing the cultural mindset.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I looks at the culture in the startup
ecosystem that dictates the process of becoming a unicorn company. It describes
the general problems that exist within startup culture and the way the problems
manifested in the context of Theranos. Part I also unearths the ways in which
race and other cultural norms play a role in entrepreneurial success. Part I notes
dramatic racial, gender, and class differences across venture capital funding,
innovation levels, profitability, and the economy as a whole. Part II describes
the traditional private fundraising mechanisms for entrepreneurs and investors,
building on Part I to discuss perverse market incentives that perpetuate racism
and classism within the context of the private markets. Additionally, Part II
demonstrates the ways the private markets effectively enforce and perpetuate the
closed homogenous culture in Silicon Valley in which entrepreneurs are required
to raise money. While a detailed discussion of any policy proposals for changing
the private financial markets is outside the scope of this Article, Part III offers
some considerations toward challenging and changing institutional bias in
Silicon Valley. While this Article focuses on Silicon Valley, the approaches and
practices in the region among the entrepreneurial community have implications
for entrepreneurial ecosystems nationally, and increasingly, internationally.

I. CHASING UNICORNS: STARTUP CULTURE AND THE HEURISTICS THAT
ENABLE IT
Within limits, Silicon Valley places a primacy on disruption and
innovation.40 Generally, new ventures seeking to be a disruptive company or a
company that innovates and changes existing ways of doing business are
lauded.41 While those in the space admire some level of disruption, in many
40. See DAVID EISWERT, EMILY SCUDDER & JOEL GRANT, T. ROWE PRICE INSIGHTS, TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION AND DISRUPTION 1 (2019), https://www.troweprice.com/content/dam/fai/Collections/
MarketScene/tech_innovation_disruption/Tech_Innovation_Disruption_Insight.pdf; see Maximilian Schroeck
& Gopal Srinivasan, How to Innovate the Silicon Valley Way, DELOITTE: INSIGHTS (July 22, 2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/innovation/tapping-into-silicon-valley-culture-ofinnovation.html (“Silicon Valley has been driving innovation and disruption for several decades, and through
the beginning of the 21st century, it continues to be one of the world’s most important centers of innovation and
technology disruption. The region is notable for its combination of widely available capital and rapid scale-up
of commercially viable intellectual property (IP). More than one-third of the 141 companies in the Americas,
Europe, and Asia Pacific that grew to a valuation of greater than $1 billion between 2010 and 2015 were located
in the Bay Area, a striking testament to the area’s ability to accelerate commercial success. Perhaps for this
reason, 61 percent of companies with innovation centers have a presence in Silicon Valley.” (citation omitted)
(footnote omitted)).
41. See Barry Ritzholz, The World Is About to Undergo Even Faster Change, INDUSTRYWEEK (July 6,
2017), https://www.industryweek.com/technology/world-about-undergo-even-faster-change; Clayton M.
Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, What Is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec.
2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-innovation (“Many leaders of small, entrepreneurial
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ways though, participants in the space are consistent in entrenching power and
influence so that even innovative unicorn companies disrupting industries
effectively reinforce the existing power structure and traditional influences of
institutions and those of a certain pedigree.
High-growth companies looking to achieve unicorn status often seek to
develop the latest innovation or game-changing product in order to disrupt the
industry status quo. Some of the most famous unicorns, for example, Uber,
GrubHub, and AirBnB, capitalized on smartphones and cloud-based software to
disrupt taxi, food, and hotel industries by making them mobile.42
The ride-sharing company Uber Technologies, Inc. is a poster child for
Silicon’s Valley endless quest for innovation.43 Uber has been so prominent in
the startup economy that the drastic changes in industries as a result of it have
been referred to as “uberisation.”44 Uber is a company that revolutionized the
taxi industry, promoting environmentally friendly ride-sharing and ostensibly
creating new jobs along the way.45 Since its official launch in 2011 and until its
initial public offering in 2019, critics of the company have argued that constantly
pushing for growth, innovation, and profit led the company to mistakes and
deviations from its original mission.46 Uber has been criticized for its unfair
treatment of drivers, for disrupting the taxicab business, for increasing traffic
congestion, and for fostering a toxic workplace culture where retaliation and
sexual harassment festered. 47 The company has also been criticized for its
aggressive strategy in dealing with taxi regulators and for other potentially
unlawful practices.48 The company most recently came under fire for neglecting
and exploiting its drivers, since Uber maintains and lobbies for the position that
its drivers are independent contractors and therefore not eligible for the
protections that an employer-employee relationship provides.49 Further, Uber

companies praise [disruptive innovation] as their guiding star; so do many executives at large, well-established
organizations, including Intel, Southern New Hampshire University, and Salesforce.com.”).
42. KC Karnes, 5 Disruptive Apps and How They Changed Their Industries, CLEVERTAP (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://clevertap.com/blog/disruptive-apps/; see also David Touve & Gosia Glinska, Fact or Fiction? Debunking
the Founder Myth, UVA DARDEN: IDEAS TO ACTION (Sept. 12, 2019), https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/fact-orfiction.
43. Fan, supra note 9, at 633 (“Uber is the poster child for unicorns.”).
44. Simon Jack, Now What Next for Uberisation?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/
news/business-41359327 (“Uberisation has come to mean the turning of traditional service industries on their
head, by providing a technological platform to match users and providers on a massive scale.”).
45. Martin Luenendonk, 7 Strategies Uber Is Using to Disrupt the Taxi Industry, CLEVERISM (Feb. 16,
2018), https://www.cleverism.com/strategies-uber-is-using-to-disrupt-the-taxi-industry/; see About Us, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/us/en/about/ (last visited May 21, 2021).
46. See Farhad Manjoo, Opinion, The Uber I.P.O. Is a Moral Stain on Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (May 1,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/opinion/uber-ipo.html.
47. See id.
48. Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-precipice.html?module=inline.
49. See Michael Hiltzik, Column: With Prop. 22, Uber and Lyft Used Their Wealth to Reshape Labor Law
in Their Sole Interest, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-1104/uber-lyft-proposition-22.
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drivers are not paid a living wage.50 Arguably, its environmental arguments have
not yet been made clear; while certainly ride-sharing has increased and may have
encouraged some to forego a vehicle, vehicle ownership has increased in cities
where Uber and Uber’s competitor, Lyft, are popular. 51 Research shows that
ride-hailing growth has led to more traffic and less transit use in major American
cities—not the reverse that was hoped for.52
Uber and Lyft combined forces on lobbying efforts for an exemption from
California’s A.B. 5 law. An exemption would allow the rise share companies to
continue to treat their drivers as employees rather than independent contractors.
Their lobbying efforts led to the most expensive campaign in California
history. 53 In November 2020, California voters passed Proposition 22,
exempting drivers and other gig economy workers from A.B. 5 and classifying
them as independent contractors.54 On the one hand, Uber and Lyft are lauded
as innovating companies who have disrupted an entire industry, but on the other
hand, they spent record amounts of money to lobby to maintain social and racial
inequities, lobbying against a law that would have offered drivers minimum
wage, overtime pay, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and paid
sick leave.55 Yet, because of Uber’s success, founders of other startups seeking
to replicate its success and investors backing those founders look to Uber as the
“blueprint.”
A. HOMOGENEITY AND THE EFFECT OF LACK OF DIVERSITY
The startup world—its investors and entrepreneurs—is a mostly
homogenous, white and male community.56 Intentions aside, the startup space

50. See Shannon Bond, Uber and Lyft to Continue Treating Drivers as Independent Contractors, NPR
(Nov. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/04/931435959/uber-and-lyft-to-continue-treatingdrivers-as-independent-contractors.
51. See BRUCE SCHALLER, SCHALLER CONSULTING, THE NEW AUTOMOBILITY: LYFT, UBER AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN CITIES 2 (2018), http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/automobility.pdf (“TNCs
[transportation network companies] added billions of miles of driving in the nation’s largest metro areas at the
same time that car ownership grew more rapidly than the population.”).
52. Id. (“Shared ride services . . . while touted as reducing traffic, in fact add mileage to city streets. They
do not offset the traffic-clogging impacts of private ride TNC services like UberX and Lyft.”).
53. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Prop 22 Passes in California, Exempting Uber and Lyft from Classifying Drivers
as Employees, CNN (Nov. 4, 2020, 4:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/04/tech/california-proposition22/index.html.
54. Id.
55. Uber exemplifies the innovation paradox in Silicon Valley. It is a company that literally transformed
an entire industry, reshaping transportation across the globe, and also sparked the transformation of many other
industries as startups inspired by Uber created on-demand services in other spaces. Yet despite all of its
innovation, the technology company has been plagued by sexist and toxic culture in the workplace and took an
approach to paying its labor force that many would argue entrenches the status quo. See supra notes 47, 49–50
and accompanying text.
56. See Kim-Mai Cutler, Here’s a Detailed Breakdown of Racial and Gender Diversity Data Across U.S.
Venture Capital Firms, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/06/s23p-racialgender-diversity-venture/?guccounter=1.
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has been dominated by middle and upper-class white males. 57 This issue is
distinct from the pattern matching and implicit bias described below. The
distinct point made by this Subpart is that those involved in the startup
ecosystem are likely white and male. According to one analysis, 77.1% of
venture-backed founders are white and 90.8% of them are men.58 More white
men than white women and more white men than men of color are involved in
entrepreneurship. 59 As with entrepreneurs of color, women founders face an
uphill battle when convincing investors of the value of their products and their
ideas.60 Race and gender play a role in entrepreneurship, but increasingly class
is proving a factor as well.61 Just under half of venture capitalists attended either
Harvard or Stanford.62 “The homogeneity is geographic, too: more than 90% of
venture capitalists surveyed lived on the East or West coasts” according to the
National Venture Capital Association. 63 Little data is known about the
representation of angel investors or friends and family investors. In their report,
Access to Capital for Entrepreneurs: Removing Barriers, the Kauffman
Foundation looks at geographic barriers to accessing capital:

57. Mary Ann Azevedo, Untapped Opportunity: Minority Founders Still Being Overlooked, CRUNCHBASE
(Feb. 27, 2019), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/untapped-opportunity-minority-founders-still-beingoverlooked/.
58. RATEMYINVESTOR, DIVERSITY IN U.S. STARTUPS 7–8 (2018), https://ratemyinvestor.com/
DiversityVCReport_Final.pdf.
59. See id. at 1, 8–10.
60. Lynn Perkins, How to Secure VC Funding When You’re the Only Woman in the Room, ENTREPRENEUR:
WOMEN (July 31, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/316019; see also Press Release, Morgan Stanley,
Access to Capital Survey: Investors Perceive Funding Landscape as Balanced, Despite a Substantial Gap in
Their Actual Investments in Female and Multicultural Entrepreneurs (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.morganstanley.com/press-releases/access-to-capital-survey--investors-perceive-fundinglandscape-a (“Nearly 40% of men say that investing in women-owned businesses is not a priority at all,
compared to only 7% of female investors. Similarly, 31% of white investors say they do not prioritize investing
in minority-owned businesses. Investors report being less likely to connect to the sectors that female and
multicultural entrepreneurs serve. Nearly half of investors (47%) cite an entrepreneur’s sector as a compelling
reason why they invest in businesses in general, but that number drops to 36% for women-owned businesses and
33% for minority-owned businesses.”). Further, the survey finds that investors’ perception is that multicultural
and women business owners get the right amount, or more, of capital they deserve to run and grow their
businesses.
The
Trillion-Dollar
Blind
Spot,
MORGAN
STANLEY
(Dec.
11,
2018),
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/trillion-dollar-blind-spot-infographic/. The reality is that investors report
capitalizing multicultural and women-owned businesses at 80% less than businesses overall. Id.
61. “Data from 1996 to 2017 show that men are consistently more likely to start businesses each month
than women, and 2017 was the first year in which the rate of black and white new entrepreneurs was the same.”
VICTOR HWANG, SAMEEKSHA DESAI & ROSS BAIRD, KAUFFMAN FOUND., ACCESS TO CAPITAL FOR
ENTREPRENEURS: REMOVING BARRIERS 1 (2019), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
CapitalReport_042519.pdf.
62. Simone Stolzoff, Venture Capital’s Diversity Problem in Two Words: Alma Mater, QUARTZ (July 31,
2018), https://qz.com/1343912/venture-capitals-diversity-problem-in-two-words-alma-mater/.
63. Elizabeth Scharpf, This Is Not a Typo: Only 3% of Americans Are Legally Allowed to Invest in StartUps, Quartz (June 22, 2015), https://qz.com/431198/this-is-not-a-typo-only-3-of-americans-are-legallyallowed-to-invest-in-start-ups/.
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Five metro areas—New York City, Miami, Los Angeles, Houston, and
Dallas—were estimated to have contributed to 50 percent of net new firm
creation between 2010 and 2014.
In addition, VC industry data reveals considerable geographic and
industry concentration. Close to 80 percent of about $21.1 billion in VC
funding in the first quarter of 2018 was disbursed in five regional clusters—
San Francisco (North Bay Area), Silicon Valley (South Bay Area), New
England, New York City metro, and LA/Orange County—with slightly more
than 44 percent in the North and South Bay Areas.64

While public companies face public scrutiny and advocacy around the
composition of their board of directors, private companies face less scrutiny.
Indeed, although there is less publicly available information on private board
diversity data, there is a lack of gender and racial diversity on private company
boards.65
A study of private board diversity data was produced by a collaboration
between Crunchbase and Him for Her.66 In 2020, the researchers looked at the
boards of the most heavily funded U.S.-based private venture-backed companies
and found that 49% of companies did not have a woman on the board.67 “Women
held 11 percent of board seats, up from 7 percent the previous year.” 68
Executives and investors compose 75% of director seats, of which 8% are held
by women.69 Their initial analysis of racial and ethnic revealed that “only 3
percent of board seats were held by women of color, compared with an estimated
18 percent held by men of color; and 81 percent of companies don’t have a
woman of color on the board at all.”70 Nearly half of private company boards
are all male.71 “The ratio of men to women in private-company boardrooms is
roughly 9-to-1.”72 According to the researchers, at current rates, “it will take a
decade for private company boards to achieve gender parity.”73 Most women
directors are the only women on the board. “Among the roughly half of boards
that include any women, 66 percent include just one woman.”74 Of the private
company boards studied, only 18% included two or more women. 75 “While
research suggests that boards need at least three women to capture the full
64. HWANG ET AL., supra note 61, at 7 (footnote omitted).
65. See Jennifer S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The Impact of Women on Private Company Boards, 46 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 345, 345 (2019).
66. Ann Shepherd & Gené Teare, 2020 Study of Gender Diversity on Private Company Boards,
CRUNCHBASE (Mar. 1, 2021), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/2020-diversity-study-on-private-companyboards/.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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economic benefits of diversity, only 6 percent of the companies studied met this
criteria.”76
Among the country’s largest companies, a 2018 study of Fortune 500
boards found 4.6% of directors were “minority women.”77 Fewer than one in
five of the companies studied had a single woman of color in the boardroom.78
According to the Crunchbase and Him for Her Report:
Directors on private-company boards can be classified in three groups:
executive directors, investor directors and independent directors. CEOs, cofounders and any members of the management team who hold board seats are
considered executive directors, which make up 22 percent of the board seats
within the companies studied.
As venture-backed companies raise outside funding, investors often take
seats on the board. Within the study data, investor directors make up the
largest pool of board members for venture-backed companies, with 53 percent
of seats.79

The study found that “[b]oards can improve diversity by adding independent
directors at an earlier stage and drawing from a diverse candidate pool sourced
beyond the personal networks of sitting directors.”80
Research on homogenous groups shows that the more a person looks like
ourselves, the more we are willing to trust them.81 We put too much trust in the
judgment of people who look similar to us. Homogenous groups feel more
comfortable and don’t generate enough skepticism. 82 Diverse groups, in
contrast, are more likely to ask tough questions and uncover important facts.
Diversity increases innovation and leads to increased profits. 83
Inequity is likely to occur when there is such pervasive homogeneity.84 The
prevalence of homogeneity in Silicon Valley exacerbates the problem of implicit

76. Id.
77. DELOITTE, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND
MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 17 fig.6 (2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/center-for-boardeffectiveness/articles/missing-pieces-fortune-500-board-diversity-study-2018.html (click “Download the PDF”
to download).
78. Shepherd & Teare, supra note 66.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Steve Kelman, Group Diversity and the Accuracy of Group Judgments, FWC: THE LECTERN (Dec. 14,
2015, 12:29 PM), https://fcw.com/blogs/lectern/2015/12/kelman-group-diversity.aspx; Harry Farmer, Ryan
McKay & Manos Tsakiris, Trust in Me: Trustworthy Others Are Seen as More Physically Similar to the Self, 25
PSYCH. SCI. 290, 290–92 (2014) (“Coupled with research suggesting that people have overly positive self-views,
including viewing themselves as more trustworthy than the average person, these findings suggest that people
favor those who are physically similar to themselves. Indeed, facial similarity leads to increased attributions of
trustworthiness and increased cooperation in both trust games and common-good games.” (citations omitted)).
82. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS (2019) (writing that our cognitive biases tend
toward believing what others say is the truth with little natural skepticism).
83. See Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/; Fan, supra note 65.
84. See generally BUCK GEE & DENISE PECK, ASCEND FOUND., THE ILLUSION OF ASIAN SUCCESS: SCANT
PROGRESS FOR MINORITIES IN CRACKING THE GLASS CEILING FROM 2007–2015 (2017), https://cdn.ymaws.com/
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bias and pattern matching that is described below. The next Subpart discusses
how the culture of fundraising, pattern matching and implicit bias play a role in
the chase for the next unicorn.
B. FUNDRAISING AND PATTERN MATCHING
The pursuit of unicorn status is comparable to the California gold rush and
exemplifies a culture of pursuing growth at all costs.85 The mentality of trying
to get a piece of that gold, metaphorically speaking, is what drives the culture.86
In order to grow fast, entrepreneurs rely on private capital to finance their goals.
Capital raising, and the private market that supports it, is big business and
probably the number one driver of startup culture.87 For a high-growth startup
venture, most founders are in a constant cycle of fundraising and prototyping for
the product or service offered by their company. Founders typically start their
company using their own funds, in a practice that is known as “bootstrapping.”88
Once they have used the available funds and resources available to them, they
may turn to their friends and family to raise additional capital.89 Where available
to them, founders may often ask their parents to take out a second mortgage on
their home or the founder may mortgage her own home. 90 It will be discussed
in more detail below, but it is worth noting here how history, racism, and the
racial wealth gap affect who typically can bootstrap and can access these initial
financial resources. 91 Many entrepreneurs of color cannot tap into any
www.ascendleadership.org/resource/resmgr/research/theillusionofasiansuccess.pdf (pointing to distinctive
diversity challenges for each racial and gender cohort in Bay Area technology companies and showing that the
racial gap is worsening).
85. The California gold rush occurred during the middle of the nineteenth century and led directly to the
settlement of California. Mike McPhate, How the California Gold Rush Echoes in Silicon Valley, MEDIUM:
CALIF. SUN (Jan. 23, 2018), https://medium.californiasun.co/gold-rush-34072fd9d467.
86. See id. (highlighting the Californian tolerance for failure in capitalist enterprise, which the author
asserts stems from California’s encounter with gold-mining).
87. See generally NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF
VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 9 (5th ed. 2009),
http://faculty.msmc.edu/hossain/grad_bank_and_money_policy/economic%20importance%20of%20venture%
20capital%20backed%20companies.pdf.
88. R.L. Adams, 8 Bulletproof Ways to Bootstrap Your Business, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/305600 (defining bootstrapping in business as “self-funding through preexisting cash flow and being critical of outgoing expenses”).
89. See Alejandro Cremades, How Funding Rounds Work for Startups, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2018, 5:14 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alejandrocremades/2018/12/26/how-funding-rounds-work-for-startups/
#13bcd33b7386; The Ins and Outs of Raising Money from Friends and Family, ENTREPRENEUR,
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228103 (last visited May 21, 2021).
90. See Gene Marks, Entrepreneurs Are Great, But It’s Mom and Dad Who Gave Them Their Start,
GUARDIAN (Jan 31, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/jan/31/small-businessentrepreneurs-success-parents; Should Parents Fund a Child’s Startup Company?, TARANTINO L. FIRM, LLP
(Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.tarantinolaw.com/blog/2019/12/should-parents-fund-a-childs-startup-company/;
Krista Tuomi, Mortgage Financing: Dangerous Headwinds for Startups, VC LIST (May 1, 2020), https://vclist.com/mortgage-financing-startups/.
91. Keenan Beasley, For Black Entrepreneurs, the Racial Wealth Gap Makes Finding Funding Nearly
Impossible, FAST CO. (July 23, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90531094/for-black-entrepreneurs-theracial-wealth-gap-makes-finding-funding-nearly-impossible (“[A] historical product of the racial wealth gap—
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meaningful resources to bootstrap their venture. After founders have exhausted
the resources of their friends and family, founders might then turn to angel
investors or venture capital investors for additional capital.92 For high-growth
companies, venture capital investment can prove instrumental for startup
success since venture capital-backed companies are more likely to succeed than
non-venture backed firms.93
For each round of funding, the valuation of the company becomes
increasingly important as the valuation reflects the value of the investor’s
investment. 94 Valuation is a driver towards investment because a higher
valuation increases the value of the investor’s investment. It should be noted that
high valuation does not necessarily correlate to a strong business model nor does
it speak to the venture’s profitability. Although a company may have hit a
billion-dollar valuation on the private market, some unicorn companies may not
have a working business model; the company may or may not even be profitable,
yet investors believing in a company’s mission, its potential, or its founder may
clamor to invest and, in turn, push up the valuation.95 In fact, many unicorn
companies are often not profitable.96 Several unicorn companies that captured
our collective imagination we now know did not have a clear plan for
profitability, such as Uber, Palantir, and Zenefits,97 for example. The influx of
capital and funding propelled these companies to success, not because they were
the most efficient or capable company, demonstrating that investors are not
the inherent disparity in median wealth between people of different races—most Black entrepreneurs do not
have access to a network that can provide them with a type of investment known as a “Friends and Family”
round.”).
92. See Cremades, supra note 89 (explaining that the pre-seed round is often the “friends and family”
round, and more angel investors come in during the seed round).
93. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1411
(2008).
94. See Nathan Reiff, Series A, B, C, Funding: How It Works, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/102015/series-b-c-funding-what-it-all-means-andhow-it-works.asp (Mar. 5, 2020).
95. According to Pitchbook, “[s]ixty-four percent of the 100+ companies valued at more than $1 billion to
complete a VC-backed IPO since 2010 were unprofitable, and in 2018, money-losing startups actually fared
better on the stock exchange than money-earning businesses.” Kate Clark, Unicorns Aren’t Profitable, and Wall
Street Doesn’t Care, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 26, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/03/26/unicornsarent-profitable-wall-street-doesnt-care; CAMERON STANFILL & JORDAN BECK, PITCHBOOK, SEARCHING FOR
VALIDATION: AN ANALYSIS OF VALUATION PERFORMANCE FOR $1 BILLION+ VC-BACKED EXITS 10–11 (2019),
https://files.pitchbook.com/website/files/pdf/PitchBook_1Q_2019_Analyst_Note_Searching_for_Validation.p
df.
96. See Jeffery Lee Funk, Only 6 of 73 Unicorn Startups Are Profitable, and None Did Recent IPOs,
MEDIUM (Nov. 23, 2020), https://jeffreyleefunk.medium.com/only-6-of-73-unicorn-startups-are-profitable-andnone-did-recent-ipos-287d5c7ac8d0 (“In summary, only 6 of 73 Unicorns had profits in 2019 (and 2020) and
most of the profitable Unicorns did IPOs many years ago. This suggests that privately-held Unicorns, ones that
have yet to do IPOs, are likely unprofitable.”); Clark, supra note 95.
97. Zenefits is a company that created human resource software and paid millions of dollars in fines to
California regulators and the SEC because its employees sold insurance without proper licenses. See Heather
Somerville, Zenefits and Co-founder Parker Conrad to Pay SEC Fine of Nearly $1 Million, REUTERS (Oct. 26,
2017, 4:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zenefits-sec/zenefits-and-co-founder-parker-conrad-topay-sec-fine-of-nearly-1-million-idUSKBN1CV3NS.
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necessarily looking for profitability, but the next opportunity for the most return
on investment.98
Fundraising for a new entrepreneurial venture is challenging in that the
founder has to balance the everyday demands of starting a venture and at the
same time seek cash to maintain that venture. Silicon Valley is flush with
ambitious, unicorn-seeking founders who meet that challenge by massaging the
truth to lure investors and investors who may accept incomplete information in
the name of innovation.99 In the early days in the life of a startup, the founder
can likely be found creating her company’s product or services. In addition to
moving the company from a big idea to a tangible product or service, the founder
is also likely to be in the process of fundraising to finance the big idea. It is often
common for founders to start fundraising even before the product or service has
launched. 100 This dual track of fundraising on the basis of a big idea while
creating a tangible manifestation of the big idea has profound implications for
Black and other non-traditional entrepreneurs. One of those implications is that,
in reality, founders of color are typically required to have a viable product before
fundraising. Adding to that is that investors, who are largely white, are not likely
to take notice of founders of color. This failure could be explained by several
factors that include pattern matching and implicit bias, but also cultural factors,
reflecting a difference in cultural problems, solutions, surroundings, and
resources.101 There is an inherent tension in capital raising as entrepreneurs seek
to quickly enter the market and scale their enterprises, while innovating and
defining a product or service at the same time.
Fundraising culture is built around obfuscation of facts or the use of what
has been coined “vaporware.”102 This opaqueness is relatively common among

98. Clark, supra note 95; see J.B. Maverick, Is Profitability or Growth More Important for a Business?,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/020415/what-more-important-businessprofitability-or-growth.asp (Jan. 30, 2020) (“Profitability and growth go hand-in-hand when it comes to success
in business. Profit is key to basic financial survival as a corporate entity, while growth is key to profit and longterm success. Investors should weigh each factor as it relates to a particular company.”).
99. See generally Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Keynote Address at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate
Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-siliconvalley-initiative-3-31-16.html (“Nearly all venture valuations are highly subjective. . . . We continue to see
instances of public companies and their senior executives manipulating their accounting to meet various
expectations and projections.”).
100. See Kate Endress, How to Do Seed Fundraising Right, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 2, 2012, 8:30 AM),
https://venturebeat.com/2012/09/02/how-to-do-fundraising-right-on-a-seed-round/.
101. Norman, supra note 23.
102. The term “vaporware” was coined in the 1980s when software companies would hype their product to
obtain funding often obscuring the reality of the company’s progress. See Robert A. Prentice & John H.
Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–3 (1994). When applied in the context of the startup world, it is a term used to describe
marketing strategy to promote a brand, product, or founder in the pre-money or pre-seed stage, typically meaning
that the promotion is “little more than hot air.” Joel KO, Opinion: Why Startups Need More Vaporware and the
‘Elon Musk Effect’ to Innovate, TECHINASIA (May 26, 2017), https://www.techinasia.com/talk/time-morevaporware.
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founders and is often accepted by and even encouraged by investors.103 The idea
is that founders create aspirational forecasts and optimistic projections to present
to investors and potential investors. Founders are hoping that their mild
deception will be overlooked and forgiven once they have made their investors’
money back at a high return.104 In turn, investors are hoping to make money at
often outsized rates of return. It is therefore not uncommon for investors to
believe in a white founder and invest in a product or services with little evidence
of success or promises of future success.105 On the other hand, founders of color
are expected to provide a minimal viable product before pitching to investors.106
This environment creates a scenario where the investor is not always in
complete possession of the facts related to their investment. Because there is
little or no track record and often no product, investors might make investment
decisions based on instinct or their gut. The effect of relying on one’s gut is that
investors may revert to heuristics or rely upon mental short-cuts to make
investment decisions, meaning that investors default to pattern matching in how
they determine which founder or startup to invest in. Valuing innovation and
disruption means that funding and support happens at an unduly early stage,
resulting in the entire ecosystem relying on heuristics from the start.
In the absence of concrete, tangible, and objective projections, forecasts, or
products, the investor must make investment decisions based on their belief in
the founder or on gut instinct.107 The import of this phenomenon is that often
investment decisionmaking is tied to implicit bias108 and pattern matching, 109
103. Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a PostChicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1174 (1996) (discussing the utility of vaporware announcements).
104. Most investors seek no less than 20% to 40% return on their investment. See What Is Your Potential
‘Return on Investment’ for an Angel Investor?, VENTURE GIANTS (May 22, 2020),
https://www.venturegiants.com/what-is-your-potential-return-on-investment-for-an-angel-investor
(“Most
experienced Angel Investors will expect no less than 31–40% annual returns on their early stage and start up
angel investments.”); see also Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.–Dec. 1998),
https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works (“In return for financing one to two years of a company’s startup, venture capitalists expect a ten times return of capital over five years.”).
105. See generally Interview by Sally Smith Hughes with Donald T. Valentine, Founder, Sequoia Cap., in
Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 20, 2009), https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/valentine_donald.pdf.
106. Norman, supra note 23.
107. Paul Gompers, William Gornall, Steven N. Kaplan & Ilya A. Strebulaev, How Do Venture Capitalists
Make Decisions? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22587, 2016), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w22587.pdf (confirming through survey work that “VCs consider factors that include the attractiveness
of the market, strategy, technology, product or service, customer adoption, competition, deal terms and the
quality and experience of the management team. The nature of the entrepreneurial team is an important
component of the sourcing and screening process”).
108. See Melissa De Witte, Venture Capital Funds Led by People of Color Face More Bias the Better They
Perform, Stanford Researchers Find, STAN. NEWS (Aug. 12, 2019), https://news.stanford.edu/2019/08/12/raceinfluences-professional-investors-judgments (“In their evaluations of high-performing venture capital funds,
professional investors rate white-led teams more favorably than they do black-led teams with identical
credentials . . . .”).
109. Cat Zakrzewski, VC Focus: Venture Industry’s ‘Pattern Matching’ Drives Bias, Critics Say, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 30, 2017, 9:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vc-focus-venture-industrys-pattern-matching-drivesbias-critics-say-1509369994; Lisa Fisher, Stemming Implicit Bias in High-Tech STEM: The Vision of Project
Include, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. SCI. 127 (2018).
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which has implications for racial, gender, and class dynamics. Studies have
proven that when a person looks similar to ourselves, we are inclined to
automatically believe they are more trustworthy. 110 Therefore, a white male
investor is more likely to invest in a white male founder than, for example, a
female founder of color. This is true, even if the business has high growth
potential and high sales; the reality is that investors tend to bring founders into
their portfolio that look like themselves, have the same status, and have the same
levels of education.111 Additionally, physical appearance can guide donation or
investment decisions not only in person-to-person networks, but even in an
anonymous and seemingly democratic vehicle such as a crowdfunding
campaign.112 This phenomenon is similar to the concept of “trust economics,” a
longstanding theory about creating systems where trust becomes a placeholder
for money.113 Investors rely on trust as they develop their financial relationships
as startup investment opportunities come from a network of trusted business
associates.114 What makes for a trusted relationship is informed by sources such
as the investor’s family and friends, many of whom fit a certain demographic.
This “network of trust” serves an important screening function for who gets
funding and who does not.115 Essentially these investors are deciding who is like
them and therefore worthy of both the investors’ trust and money. Trust
economics as an investment principle within the startup ecosystem favors white
entrepreneurs, since investors are likely to also be white. 116 These important
decisions based on trust are made regardless of metrics and in the face of
contrary metrics since women-led businesses are more profitable117 and diverse
teams are more profitable.118 Even though the empirical analysis supports the
110. Farmer et al., supra note 81, at 290–92; Damian A. Stanley, Peter Sokol-Hessner, Mahzarin R. Banaji
& Elizabeth A. Phelps, Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic Trust
Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7710, 7711 (2011).
111. See KATHRYN FINNEY, THE REAL UNICORNS OF TECH: BLACK WOMEN FOUNDERS 7 (2016).
112. See Joe Pinsker, How to Succeed in Crowdfunding: Be Thin, White, and Attractive, ATLANTIC (Aug.
3,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/crowdfunding-success-kickstarter-kivasucceed/400232/ (“Regardless of whether such bias is conscious or unconscious, the researchers had a guess as
to why some users were being swayed by physical characteristics. ‘We argue that implicit discrimination may
characterize lending decisions on Kiva [a crowdfunding site], because of the dizzying array of choices available
and the lack of any obvious decision criteria for making a funding choice,’ they write. Without anything else to
go on, users default to old stereotypes.”).
113. The Trust Economy, ATLANTIC (2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/charles-schwab-2017nt/the-trust-economy/1290.
114. Ibrahim, supra note 93, at 1432.
115. Id.
116. See DELOITTE, VC HUMAN CAPITAL SURVEY 7 (3d ed. 2021), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/
audit/articles/diversity-venture-capital-human-capital-survey.html (click “Download the PDF” to download).
117. Katie Abouzahr, Matt Krentz, John Harthorne & Frances Brooks Taplett, Why Women-Owned Startips
Are a Better Bet, BOS. CONSULTING GRP. (June 6, 2018), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2018/why-womenowned-startups-are-better-bet (“[B]usinesses founded by women ultimately deliver higher revenue—more than
twice as much per dollar invested—than those founded by men, making women-owned companies better
investments for financial backers.”).
118. Sundiatu Dixon-Fyle, Kevin Dolan, Vivian Hunt & Sara Prince, Diversity Wins: How Inclusion
Matters, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 19, 2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-
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financing of more diverse entrepreneurs, the market still invests in a pattern that
benefits white male entrepreneurs.
Further, when an investor evaluates a founder, it is common for the investor
to evaluate both the founder and the company based on a frame of reference
from past deals, other successful founders, or deals that they have heard about.
Using this frame of reference as a basis for investment decisionmaking is known
as “pattern matching.” In the entrepreneurial ecosystem, pattern matching is a
term used to explain the practice of investors, primarily angel or venture capital
investors, to evaluate startups and entrepreneurs based on what has worked in
the past. 119 For example, John Doerr, a famous investor and partner in the
venture capital firm of Kleiner Perkins, illustrated this point in a public
presentation when he said that the most successful tech entrepreneurs are “white,
male, nerds.”120 He then went on to say, “That correlates more with any other
success factor that I’ve seen in the world’s greatest entrepreneurs. If you look at
[Amazon founder Jeff] Bezos, or [Netscape founder Marc] Andreessen, [Yahoo
co-founder] David Filo, the founders of Google, they all seem to be white, male,
nerds who’ve dropped out of Harvard or Stanford and they absolutely have no
social life. So, when I see that pattern coming in—which was true of Google—
it was very easy to decide to invest.”121 It is unlikely given the statistics about
entrepreneurs of color in the startup space that investors have a frame of
reference for a Black founder or a founder of color. Rather investors look for
founders that pattern match to previous unicorn founders. Because the investor
has no frame of reference for a Black founder, the founder does not match the
pattern, and it is unlikely that the investor will take a chance and invest in a
nontraditional entrepreneur.122
The next Subpart describes how Silicon Valley thrives on the mythology
surrounding a founder and how the culture of celebrating the next messianic
“wunderkind” is not only dangerous, it reinforces the pattern matching described
above and surfaces how the brilliant founder myth was one of the drivers of
Holmes’ success at fundraising.
C. THE CULT OF PERSONALITY AND THE MYTH OF THE BRILLIANT
FOUNDER123
Silicon Valley has historically fed in to cultivating a mystique around its
legendary founders—Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk,

inclusion/diversity-wins-how-inclusion-matters# (“The most diverse companies are now more likely than ever
to outperform less diverse peers on profitability.”).
119. See Zakrzewski, supra note 109.
120. Scott Austin, Doerr and Mortiz Stir VCs in One-on-One Showdown, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2008, 11:59
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121025688414577219.
121. Id.
122. See Norman, supra note 23.
123. See Touve & Glinska, supra note 42 (“[The myth of the brilliant founder] goes something like this: a
brilliant, ambitious tech wiz—clearly born to be an entrepreneur and predictably male—has a light-bulb moment.
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for example.124 Within startup culture, there is a cult of personality that has the
effect of creating a pattern of a narrow image of who can be a founder, who can
sit on a board, and who can be an investor in the race to pursue a unicorn.125
Silicon Valley culture perpetuates this cult of personality within the startup
community. Arguably this myth of the brilliant founder emerged from the fabled
idiosyncrasies of Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg.126 As investors start to invest
in ventures, they place a primacy on finding “the next Zuckerberg” or the “next
Steve Jobs.” 127 In other words, they are looking to replicate the success of
Facebook and of Apple and believe that it comes in the form of a founder that is
white, male, and awkward like either Mark Zuckerberg or Steve Jobs.128
The cult of personality is a heuristic born of pattern matching. One
particular pattern that is attractive to investors is the pattern match of the twentysomething-year-old Stanford or Harvard drop-out with a world-changing idea.
As a result, a narrow image of who can be a game-changing founder or CEO has
emerged and there is little opportunity for different perspective or different
patterns. This pattern replicates elitism and structural racism by reinforcing the
idea that those who would consider dropping out of Ivy League institutions are
likely people who have enough money and privilege to see that choice as not
He drops out of college and bets everything on a startup, which ends up changing the world while generating
massive wealth.”).
124. See generally Isobel Asher Hamilton, This Doomsaying Art Exhibition Recasts Bezos, Musk, and
Zuckerberg as Mythological Figures Heralding the End of Civilization, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2019, 12:00
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/3-d-printed-exhibition-reimagines-bezos-musk-and-zuckerberg-asmythological-figures-2019-4.
125. Sheila Herrling, The Myth of the Entrepreneur, CASE FOUND. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://casefoundation.org/blog/the-myth-of-the-entrepreneur (discussing the vast majority of celebrated
startups continuing to be founded and funded by “white, well-educated, well-networked males”); Ian Hathaway,
The Myth of the Young Startup Founder, CTR. FOR AM. ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://startupsusa.org/the-myth-of-the-young-startup-founder/ (addressing the myth of founder age and
deeming founders to be much older than presumed (around mid-40s on average)).
The vast majority of today’s celebrated startups continue to be founded and funded by white, welleducated, well-networked males. Women are at the helm of 30 percent of all businesses in the US,
and these businesses are leading the way in terms of hiring and growth. However, startups with
women CEOs still receive only three percent of venture capital funding. Minority-owned businesses
are growing at a faster clip than non-minority owned businesses, but are receiving an even smaller
fraction of investments.
Herrling, supra; see also Touve & Glinska, supra note 42 (“Having examined the genesis stories around tech’s
biggest breakthroughs, Touve dispels the common misconception that entrepreneurs are born, not made. He also
suggests that there are four archetypes of the iconic founder: the genius, the guru, the gambler and the
gunslinger.”).
126. See Isaac Cabe, 6 Famous Tech Gurus and Their Less-Known Crazy Habits, CRACKED (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.cracked.com/article_25137_6-famous-tech-gurus-and-their-less-known-crazy-habits.html;
see
also Brian Scudamore, 6 Weird Quirks of Highly Successful Entrepreneurs (and Why They Work), INC. (June
27, 2017), https://www.inc.com/brian-scudamore/why-oddballs-make-the-best-entrepreneurs.html.
127. See Doug Gross, Who Is the Next Steve Jobs (And Is There One)?, CNN (Oct. 3, 2012, 9:34 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/10/02/tech/innovation/next-steve-jobs/index.html.
128. This form of pattern matching is common in fundraising. The term “pattern-matching” originated from
computer science, and it describes the matching and locating of specific sequences of data of some pattern among
raw data or a sequence of tokens. Definition: Pattern Matching, EDUCATIVE, https://www.educative.io/
edpresso/definition-pattern-matching (last visited May 21, 2021).
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much of a lifelong risk. This is likely because they can always get back into an
elite institution, always pay for it, their parents will support them in the interim,
or they won’t be perceived as irresponsible or ruining their life. Therefore, those
who are considered “super smart” Ivy League dropouts with a big idea are likely
going to be a white, privileged person.
Although the numbers are on the rise, successful founders of color are
largely absent in entrepreneurship because of a demonstrated lack of access to
capital.129 It is not just lack of access to capital, it is also the lack of inclusion of
Black founders in the space. Many entrepreneurs of color do not have access to
the traditionally white, male investors and advisors that Holmes relied on for
funding Theranos. Generally, white (mostly male) entrepreneurs have more
access to capital than any other group.130 Venture capital firms employ mostly
white men and then invest almost exclusively in companies owned by white
men.131 One percent of American venture capital-backed founders are Black and
the percentage of Black people in decisionmaking roles within venture capital is
not much better. 132 These numbers are relevant given the nature and role of
pattern matching and cult of personality (described below) at play in private
fundraising.133 This bias stems from barriers to early-stage capital and a lack of
representation in the investing space and is perpetuated by systems of racism
that destroy opportunity within communities of color.134 Fundraising culture and
practices created an inherent funding bias.135

129. See GEE & PECK, supra note 84, at 3.
130. See Elizabeth MacBride, Is Entrepreneurship Becoming the Purview of Upper-Class Men?, FORBES
(May 31, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethmacbride/2019/05/31/is-entrepreneurshipbecoming-the-purview-of-upper-class-men/#59739d0cd594 (exploring areas of access available to white males
through a Kauffman Foundation report); HWANG ET AL., supra note 61, at 10–14.
131. Jeanette Settembre, Venture Capitalists Still Give Most of Their Money to White Men, Study Finds,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 13, 2019, 1:43 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/venture-capitalists-still-givemost-of-their-money-to-white-men-study-finds-2019-02-13.
132. Azevedo, supra note 57.
133. See Sarah Lyons-Padilla, Hazel Rose Markus, Ashby Monk, Sid Radhakrishna, Radhika Shah, Norris
A. “Daryn” Dodson IV & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Race Influences Professional Investors’ Financial Judgments,
116 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17225, 17226 (2019) (“[I]n the world of investing, high-performing teams led by
people of color are a rarity, and they fail to fit the template of what a successful fund manager looks like.”). Even
after first getting in the door, groups stereotyped as incompetent (for example, Black people) have a harder time
advancing professionally than groups stereotyped as competent (for example, white people). Because having a
strong track records is inconsistent with stereotypes about funds owned by people of color, asset allocators might
be unable to recognize and appropriately evaluate these teams. Instead, they may fall back on pattern matching
strategies and mitigate risk by sticking with familiar options—that is to say, by continuing to invest in white and
male teams.
134. See id. at 17225–26.
135. See id. While this study does not address a connection between racial bias and funding startups, it
speaks to a general racial bias in fundraising practices and culture, finding that:
At stronger performance levels, asset allocators rate White-led funds more favorably than they do
Black-led funds. At weaker performance levels, asset allocators actually prefer Black-led teams to
White-led teams. However, asset allocators are unlikely to invest in weaker funds, diverse or
otherwise. These results suggest that beyond racial disparities in the pipeline, there are additional
systemic racial disparities in how investors evaluate funds and allocate money.
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Implicit bias is a form of the more general phenomenon of pattern
matching. Because the line between aspiration and reality is blurred and, as
described above, is likely obscured by founders to potential investors, investors
rely on their gut and pattern matching, which can lead to implicit bias.136 For
example, the investor believes that the founder may be a worthy investment
because the founder dresses like Mark Zuckerberg or shares idiosyncratic traits
as those of Steve Jobs, and therefore the investor is willing to bet on that founder
based on those characteristics. 137 The “worthy” founder likely went to the right
higher education institutions, as a result has sponsors or mentors from the right
echelons to endorse them, and access to financial and cultural capital. Silicon
Valley’s cultural practices build on the socio-economic and racial forces that
have built wealth for certain populations while literally devaluing others. The
import of this is that despite the emphasis that Silicon Valley places on
innovation and disruption of the status quo, the culture of Silicon Valley builds
on the existing dominant racial and class practices to the detriment of
entrepreneurs of color. In other words, the same ways that racial, social, and
class hierarchies show up in larger society, they are equally reflected in Silicon
Valley. Thus, those who do not have similar characteristics as the hegemonic
participants in Silicon Valley culture—that is, women and founders of color—
face challenges in accessing capital.138
Bias in the private investment system defies the logic of capitalism. 139
There is an unrecognized downside to pattern matching and implicit bias in this
space. Pattern recognition has enabled venture capitalists to mitigate risk but has
also limited their profit potential. In 2016, the Center for Global Policy Solutions
reported that due to discriminatory financing practices and a bias towards
Id. at 17225.
136. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
137. See Channing Hargrove, What Was Elizabeth Holmes Trying to Prove with Those Black Turtlenecks?,
REFINERY29 (Mar. 6, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2019/03/226213/elizabeth-holmesblack-turtleneck-suit-steve-jobs-style (“Reportedly, Holmes was so obsessed with owning the exact Issey
Miyake black turtleneck Jobs wore in his iconic key note presentations (and every other day of his working life)
that she reportedly tracked down and stocked up on the pieces, which were reissued in 2017 for $270.”). The
general trend is to dress like Zuckerberg or Jobs to establish a brand identity.
138. See Ben Hecht, Why Entrepreneurs of Color Are Struggling, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2018, 8:26 AM),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/closing-the-racial-startup-gap/557012 (“The systems in place for
identifying, fostering and supporting entrepreneurs favor white males from the start. A recent study from
Stanford economist Raj Chetty and his colleagues at the Equality of Opportunity Project found that people of
color, women, and children from low-income families become inventors at a fraction of the rate of white men,
often despite demonstrating higher performance at a young age.”); see also KAUFFMAN FOUND., INCLUDING
PEOPLE OF COLOR IN THE PROMISE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP (2016), https://www.kauffman.org/-/media/
kauffman_org/resources/2016/including-people-of-color-in-the-promise-of-entrepreneurship-pdf.pdf.
139. Christopher Steiner, Biases: The Biggest Force Holding Back Startup Investors, FUNDERSCLUB: BLOG
(Oct. 26, 2016), https://fundersclub.com/blog/2016/10/26/biases-biggest-force-holding-back-startup-investors
(providing a statement from K2 Global Managing Partner Minal Hasan) (“Pattern recognition stems from a fear
of investing in people or spaces that are new or unknown. . . . [Y]ou can lose out on some of the most innovative
and game-changing technologies because they’re either unfamiliar to you, or because they don’t fit a neat
mold.”).
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companies primarily operated by white males, America is losing out on over 1.1
million minority-owned businesses, and as a result, foregoing over 9 million
potential jobs and $300 billion in collective national income.140
D. APPLYING FUNDRAISER AND FOUNDER INCENTIVES TO THERANOS AND
OTHER UNICORN COMPANIES
Research shows that board diversity can be an effective safeguard against
bad apples. 141 Diversity helps boards prevent problems and prevents
comfortability with business practices as well as opens them up to new ideas.
Companies with more gender diversity on their boards, for example, are less
likely to reissue financial statements because of error or fraud. Diverse groups
also tend to consider more factors when making a decision. Racially mixed
juries deliberate longer, share more information, discuss a wider range of
relevant factors and even make fewer mistakes when recalling facts about a
140. ALGERNON AUSTIN, CTR. FOR GLOB. POL’Y SOLS., THE COLOR OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: WHY THE
RACIAL GAP AMONG FIRMS COST THE U.S. BILLIONS 3 (2016), http://globalpolicysolutions.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/Color-of-Entrepreneurship-report-final.pdf.
141. See Aida Sijamic Wahid, The Effects and the Mechanisms of Board Gender Diversity: Evidence from
Financial Manipulation, 159 J. BUS. ETHICS 705, 721–22 (2019) (finding that gender diversity on boards better
ensure less financial misconduct); Deb DeHaas, Linda Akutagawa & Skip Spriggs, Missing Pieces Report: The
2018 Board Diversity Census of Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 5, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/05/missing-pieces-report-the-2018board-diversity-census-of-women-and-minorities-on-fortune-500-boards; see also Why Diversity and Inclusion
Matter: Quick Take, CATALYST (June 24, 2020), https://www.catalyst.org/research/why-diversity-andinclusion-matter. The Missing Pieces Report seems to be the most popular source of research for this claim, but
the following article also appears supportive. George Tepe, Boards Should Use Diversity as a Defense Against
Activists, COLUM. L. SCH.: BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 21, 2017), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/09/21/
boards-should-use-diversity-as-a-defense-against-activists/ (explaining how diverse boards protect against
investor activist campaigns that tend to diminish diversity) (“Board diversity helps promote social justice by
ensuring that corporate leaders reflect the diversity of all corporate constituencies and the wider society. In
addition, more diverse boards perform better financially and are less likely to be involved with bad governance
or even bribery or fraud. Using board diversity as a hostile defense tactic adds another reason to diversify boards.
By preemptively increasing the diversity of its board, a corporation increases the likelihood that an activist
investor will attempt to replace board members with less diverse candidates. Moreover, the value of board
diversity as a defense gives incumbent boards an incentive to increase diversity beyond a few seats. The more
diverse a board, the more effective the defense.” (footnotes omitted)). Researchers have found that the following
benefits are associated with gender-diverse corporate boards:
• Effective risk-management practices. Adding women to a board can improve investment
efficiency and prevent risky overinvestment decisions as well as reduce the overconfidence of male
CEOs.
• Increased engagement among board members, including behavior like requesting additional
information or updates on subjects being discussed and acting on specific tasks after board
meetings.
• Fewer financial reporting mistakes and controversial business practices such as fraud and
earnings manipulation.
• Investment in higher-quality audits.
Companies with gender-diverse management teams experience fewer operations-related lawsuits.
Why Diversity and Inclusion Matter: Quick Take, supra; see also Wahid, supra, at 706 (“Using a sample of 6132
unique ﬁrms over the period from 2000 to 2010, I ﬁnd, consistent with the hypothesis, gender diversity to be
associated with a lower likelihood of ﬁnancial manipulation, even after controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors (ﬁrmﬁxed eﬀects) and factoring in endogeneity issues through an instrumental variable approach.”).
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case. Ironically, lab experiments show that while homogenous groups do less
well on complex tasks, the report feeling more confident about their
decisions.142

However, board diversity is an afterthought.143 Larry Fink, the Chief Executive
Officer of BlackRock, a global investment firm which manages $6.3 trillion in
assets, opined in an open letter to chief executive officers that diverse boards
result in “a more aware and diverse mindset. They are less likely to succumb to
groupthink or miss new threats to a company’s business model. And they are
better able to identify opportunities that promote long-term growth.144
The lack of Board and investor diversity may have contributed to
Theranos’ fraud. From its incorporation in 2003 until 2018, Holmes was the
company’s Chief Executive Officer. 145 She recruited her former chemical
engineering professor at Stanford to serve as its first Board member.146 Through
the life of the company, Theranos had on its Board some of the country’s great
citizens. She recruited former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to join the
Board, and he would become one of her biggest champions even when his own
grandson, who was briefly employed by Theranos as a researcher, revealed
himself to be a whistleblower regarding Theranos’ research practices in its
lab.147 George Shultz also played a role in recruiting an all-star board of former
military experts and diplomats, which included former U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Perry, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former
U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, former U.S. Senator and heart-transplant surgeon Bill
Frist, Admiral George Roughead, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense James
Mattis. 148 The Board also included an all-star cast of executives, including
former Wells Fargo Chairman Richard Kovacevich, former CEO of Bechtel
Group Riley Bechtel, venture capitalist and former CEO of Oracle Don Lucas,149
and the founder and chairman of Boies Schiller Flexner, David Boies.150 From

142. Chris Clearfield & Andras Tilcsik, Opinion, How Board Diversity Might Have Prevented the Theranos
Fiasco, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/robcommentary/how-board-diversity-might-have-prevented-the-theranos-fiasco/article38304767/.
143. Sukhinder Singh Cassidy, Board Diversity Still Stumbling Block to Good Governance, INFO. (Nov. 28,
2017, 6:45 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/board-diversity-still-stumbling-block-to-goodgovernance.
144. Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose/.
145. Pflanzer, supra note 11.
146. Simon Firth, The Not-so-Retiring Retirement of Channing Robertson, STAN. ENG’G (Feb. 28, 2012),
https://engineering.stanford.edu/news/not-so-retiring-retirement-channing-robertson.
147. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 184–200.
148. Lydia Ramsey Pflanzer, How Elizabeth Holmes Convinced Powerful Men Like Henry Kissinger, James
Mattis, and George Shultz to Sit on the Board of Now Disgraced Blood-Testing Startup Theranos, BUS. INSIDER
(Mar. 19, 2019, 6:44 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-former-board-members-henry-kissingergeorge-shultz-james-mattis-2019-3.
149. Don Lucas was a founding investor who would also become Chairman of the Board at one point. See
CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 2.
150. James B. Stewart, David Boies Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/09/21/business/david-boies-pleads-not-guilty.html.
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this list of Board members, Holmes had recruited a group of august and powerful
citizens, but no health tech experts, medical professionals, or other similar
experts.
Before the scandal that would reveal the company’s claims to be fraudulent
broke, the Theranos Board was a high-powered and high-profile group who was
enthralled by Holmes, referring to her as a visionary, revolutionary, ethereal, and
akin to Beethoven.151 A look at the Board composition reveals that, other than
Elizabeth and Sunny Balwani, every single Board member—for the ten-year
duration of the company—was a white man.152 And every one of those directors
was over the age of sixty-five. 153 The average age of Theranos’ Board of
Directors was eighty years old. 154 In addition, the majority shared some
affiliation with Stanford University, through the Hoover Institute on Stanford’s
campus where several Board members were appointed Hoover Fellows.155 The
homogenous Board composition may have contributed to the multitude of
factors that enabled Holmes and Balwani to mislead investors, which included
problems related to implicit bias, pattern matching, and the cult of personality
that saw investors, employees, and board members blindly following her and
throwing millions of dollars at a company whose claims would later turn out to
be fraudulent. The orientation of the Board contributed to the embrace of the
standard narrative and pattern matching that says who a successful founder is
and what one looks like.156
Given the collective resume of the Board of Directors and Holmes’
advisers, the inability of the Board to properly supervise and oversee the
operation of the company is troubling.157 Although the Board was a high-profile
group, there was a glaring lack of diversity in almost all areas—race, gender,
and age—and subject matter expertise. The lack of diversity could have been a
reason for why the deception went unnoticed for so long. The intimate nature of
the relationships among the investors reduced the amount of due diligence that

151. Pflanzer, supra note 148; Ken Auletta, Blood, Simpler, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/15/blood-simpler.
152. See Pflanzer, supra note 148.
153. See id.
154. Pamela Wasley, The Theranos Crisis: Where Was the Board?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2016, 3:57 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2016/04/27/the-theranos-crisis-where-was-the-board/
#4be92db5c58e.
155. Richard Beales, Theranos Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/28/business/dealbook/theranos-under-fire.html.
156. See Lyons-Padilla et al., supra note 133, at 17226 (“Because having a strong track record is inconsistent
with stereotypes about funds owned by people of color, asset allocators might be unable to recognize and
appropriately evaluate these teams. Instead, they may fall back on pattern matching strategies and mitigate risk
by sticking with familiar options—that is to say, by continuing to invest in White and male teams.”).
157. See Kirsten Weir, Why We Believe Alternative Facts, 48 AM. PSYCH. ASS’N: MONITOR ON PSYCH., May
2017, at 24, 24 (“In reality, we rely on a biased set of cognitive processes to arrive at a given conclusion or
belief. This natural tendency to cherry pick and twist the facts to fit with our existing beliefs is known as
motivated reasoning . . . . Research shows we also interpret facts differently if they challenge our personal
beliefs, group identity or moral values.”).
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was conducted before investments were made. 158 The attention to detail that
might have been shown by a more outwardly diverse board was not shown by
the Theranos Board of Directors. In other words, it is likely that the similarities
shared among the Board created a false sense of security and allowed for
Holmes’ deception to go undetected. This group of older, white men, mostly
affiliated with Stanford, in some way created an environment where they never
questioned the veracity of Holmes’ research or her promises.159
Theranos is not just a story about malfeasance of one founder, but one that
profoundly illustrates the ways in which race, class, and implicit bias play out in
startup’s culture of chasing unicorn status. The fact that investors were willing
to blindly invest money in Holmes’ company, and that board members
championed her without question, despite the fact that she was a nineteen-yearold dropout with no business, healthcare, or engineering experience at the helm,
is a strong statement on the role that homogeneity played in why the company’s
investors and its Board were not as critical of Holmes and consistently gave her
the benefit of the doubt.
As described above, there is ample evidence to suggest that entrepreneurial
fundraising ability is often tied to race and class, and investors ascribe an
inordinate amount of credit to the mythical “brilliant founder,” which is likely
the result of lack of diversity and implicit bias. It is possible that with certain
high-growth startup companies, race and class bias are the cause of the
fundraising success. Perhaps evaluated in the absence of implicit biases, these
companies truly were the most meritorious when pitched to investors. However,
there are dramatic racial, gender, and class differences across startup funding,
innovation levels, profitability, and the economy as a whole. Seemingly, the
structural inequities in larger society are replicated in the startup community.160
158. See Ibrahim, supra note 93, at 1432.
159. See Pflanzer, supra note 148 (highlighting the relationships and experiences between board members
and Holmes).
On February 6, 2019, the SEC Staff issued a new interpretation relating to director qualifications
and diversity which could impact proxy statement disclosures for the upcoming proxy season, and
potentially D&O questionnaires as well. On the same day, companion bills were introduced into
both the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate that would require every public company to
disclose in proxy statements: (i) data regarding the racial, ethnic and gender composition of its
board of directors, director nominees, and executive officers, as well as the status of any such
person as a veteran, in each case, based on voluntary self-identification; and (ii) whether the board
has a policy or strategy to promote racial, ethnic and gender diversity among directors, nominees
or executive officers. The SEC’s interpretation and the Congressional “Corporate Diversity Bill”
are the latest evidence that efforts over the past two years for enhanced board diversity are gaining
considerable momentum.
Howard Dicker, Ade Heyliger & Aabha Sharma, D.C. Speaks Up: A Push for Board Diversity from the
SEC and Congress, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/25/d-c-speaks-up-a-push-for-board-diversity-from-the-secand-congress/.
160. Sarah Jeong & Rachel Becker, Science Doesn’t Explain Tech’s Diversity Problem—History Does,
VERGE (Aug. 19, 2019, 2:06 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/16/16153740/tech-diversity-problemscience-history-explainer-inequality.
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The cult of personality dictates who gets funded, but also who is the face
of the company through senior management. Holmes clearly understood this and
went to great lengths to create an image of herself and of a company that matched
a pattern of a typical successful unicorn startup. For example, she took to
dressing in all black, modeling herself after Steve Jobs.161 She brought Avie
Tevanian, senior software engineer of Apple, on board early on in the company’s
start, ostensibly luring him away from Apple to increase the credibility of
Theranos. 162 She also rented office space for Theranos in Facebook’s old
offices.163 She likely did all of these things because she recognized the outsized
importance placed on pattern matching, as opposed to a viable product. Holmes
tapped into some of those idiosyncrasies and attempted to create a similar
mystique about herself.164 She then benefited from and capitalized on this myth
of the brilliant founder.
Holmes, the “brilliant founder” of a company whose product never worked,
raised historic amounts of private capital—approximately $700 million—from
wealthy, successful venture capitalists and other prominent U.S. power
brokers.165 She also secured lucrative contracts with Walgreens and Safeway,
companies who agreed to create health and wellness centers within their stores
that would deploy the Theranos devices.166 Yet behind closed doors, Theranos
was in total disarray.167 The technology was failing, although arguably it never
worked in the first place, and the company’s work culture was cloaked in secrecy
and hostility. Turnover among key staff in the research and development
161. See Hargrove, supra note 137.
162. See Taylor Dunn, Victoria Thompson & Rebecca Jarvis, Ex-Theranos Employees Describe Culture of
Secrecy at Elizabeth Holmes’ Startup: ‘The Dropout’ Podcast Ep. 1, GOOD MORNING AM. (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.goodmorningamerica.com/news/story/theranos-employees-describe-culture-secrecy-elizabethholmes-startup-60544673.
163. Eli Segall, Theranos Growing Close to Home in Palo Alto, Silicon Valley Bus. J. (June 29, 2012, 6:00
AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/print-edition/2012/06/29/theranos-growing-close-to-home-inpalo.html.
164. For example, Holmes sought advice and investment from Avie Tevanian, former head of software
engineering for Apple who was known as Steve Jobs’ “right hand.” Dunn et al., supra note 162. Larry Ellison,
of Oracle fame, also advised Holmes. Julia Belluz, How Silicon Valley Got Played by Theranos, VOX (June 15,
2018, 4:46 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/6/12/17448584/theranos-elizabeth-holmesbad-blood; see also Nick Bilton, Exclusive: How Elizabeth Holmes’ House of Cards Came Tumbling Down,
VANITY FAIR (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-exclusive;
Francine McKenna, The Investors Duped by the Theranos Fraud Never Asked for One Important Thing,
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 20, 2018, 7:08 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-investors-duped-by-thetheranos-fraud-never-asked-for-one-important-thing-2018-03-19.
165. McKenna, supra note 164.
166. Mariella Moon, Walgreens to Offer Affordable and Needle-Free Blood Tests in More Stores (Updated),
ENGADGET (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.engadget.com/2014-11-18-walgreens-blood-tests.html; John
Carreyrou, Safeway, Theranos Split After $350 Million Deal Fizzles, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2015, 8:36 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/safeway-theranos-split-after-350-million-deal-fizzles-1447205796.
167. Emily Wasserman, Safeway Severs Ties with Theranos as $350M Deal Collapses, FIERCEBIOTECH
(Nov. 11, 2015, 10:31 AM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/medical-devices/safeway-severs-ties-theranos-as350m-deal-collapses (describing claims from executives that “the testing never started” and “Theranos missed
deadlines for its blood testing rollout and the clinics are now used mostly for flus shots and travel-related
vaccines, current and former Safeway execs told the newspaper”).
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departments as well as the finance office occurred with alarming frequency.168
Employees were subject to draconian nondisclosure agreements that were
ruthlessly enforced. 169 Despite repeated failures of the testing system, such
information about the product’s failures was hidden (to varying degrees) from
investors, customers, employees, and even Board members.170 Moreover, the
company engaged in outright lies to avoid detection by federal and state
regulators, including creating a secret laboratory and falsifying reports for the
better part of a decade.171
WeWork, a “global network of workspaces where companies and people
grow together,”172 at the time of this writing, was a unicorn company recently
fallen from grace, in eerily similar and parallel ways to Theranos.173 Although
Theranos’ downfall was fraud, WeWork’s downfall was overconfidence,
eccentricities, and incompetence. WeWork’s founder Adam Neuman promoted
a cult of personality around his company and courted investors based on him
presenting his view of the world and fostering a mystique about himself akin to
the mythical brilliant founders of the past.174 WeWork reportedly was losing
millions of dollars each month, but by the end of 2014, WeWork had raised more
than half a billion dollars from venture capitalists.175 Many of Silicon Valley’s
most prominent investors invested in the company. Eventually Softbank would
invest $4.4 billion in the company, based not on financial estimates and analysis,
but “on [WeWork’s] energy and spirituality.”176
Theranos’ and WeWork’s seemingly unlikely trajectory establishes that
both problematic fundraising practices and “brilliant founder” mythology are
intertwined with race, gender, and class. The notion of questioning Black genius
in ways that white founders are not questioned is problematic. It is unlikely that
there could ever be a Black Elizabeth Holmes—an individual with no science
background, raising billions of dollars on the claim that they could develop the
Theranos technology.177
168. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 20.
169. Id. at 27.
170. An investigation by the Food and Drug Administration revealed that Theranos’s proprietary analyzer
was used only in twelve out of 250 blood tests. The company was using competitors’ machines for the other
tests. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 113–14, 169.
171. Christopher Weaver, Theranos Secretly Bought Outside Lab Gear and Ran Fake Tests, Court Filings
Allege, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2017, 10:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-secretly-bought-outsidelab-gear-ran-fake-tests-court-filings-1492794470 (sharing that Theranos secretly brought in lab equipment to
run fake demonstrations).
172. WeWork & Meetup, WEWORK, https://www.wework.com/meetup-offer (last visited May 21, 2021).
173. See Lizzie Widdicombe, The Rise and Fall of WeWork, NEW YORKER (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-rise-and-fall-of-wework.
174. Id.
175. Charles Duhigg, How Venture Capitalists Are Deforming Capitalism, NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/30/how-venture-capitalists-are-deforming-capitalism.
176. Id.
177. See Williams, supra note 23 (“Yet it’s incredibly difficult to imagine a black woman having a chance
to reach anywhere near the heights from which Elizabeth Holmes was able to fall, because black women typically
get nowhere close to the same funding opportunities. The fact that Holmes raised over $700 million for Theranos
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Not only do these fundraising practices and culture replicate societal
inequities, but the use of implicit bias and the lack of diversity may possibly
contribute to fraud and bad investment decisions. The lack of diversity among
Theranos’ investors and the company’s Board likely contributed to hiding and
overlooking the fraud.
As is common practice in venture capital-backed startups, the members of
the Theranos board were also investors in the company. They brought in their
wealthy and powerful friends to invest in the startup as well. 178 This
phenomenon is not unique in Silicon Valley, but the practice of bringing your
friends on board to an opportunity does have implications for who gets funding
when the wealthy gatekeepers lack diversity.179 The way in which Holmes was
unfairly supported by a system designed to promote a certain class and type of
entrepreneur demonstrates the role of implicit bias in the system.
Elizabeth Holmes’ gender played an outsized role in the narrative around
her success and contributed to her being perceived as a brilliant founder. 180 As
a female inventor at the helm of the company she founded, she was an anomaly
in Silicon Valley and she represented a variation of the wunderkind theme.
Holmes was lauded as a role model and a wunderkind because her presence in
the startup world was disruptive of the male wunderkind archetype.181
Indeed, as a female founder, Holmes likely experienced gender
discrimination, but she is also white and came from socio-economic privilege.
As such, Holmes was able to move easily among the circles of elite power in
Silicon Valley because the socioeconomic forces in Silicon Valley ran in her
favor, as a white, well-educated, and connected woman. This multi-dimensional
aspect of her identity is important here because, as a woman, her gender makes
her a part of a subordinated group, but as an upper-class, white woman, her race,
as well as her class background, elevates her to a dominant group.182 In other
words, Holmes may have experienced gender discrimination, but as a wealthy,
white woman of a certain class she also experienced racial and class privilege,

is a feat for any founder but especially for a woman: As it is, scarcely 2% of VC funding goes to women CEOs.
By comparison, black women raise a paltry $36,000 in an average round.”).
178. See CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 176–183.
179. See Interview by Sally Smith Hughes with Donald L. Lucas, in Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 15, 2009),
https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/roho/ucb/text/lucas_don.pdf (exploring and explaining through the words
of participants how venture capital in the state originated in the 1960s and 1970s); see also Bettina Makalintal,
Theranos Founder Elizabeth Holmes Comes from a Baker’s Yeast Empire, VICE (Mar. 25 2019, 3:41 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wjm3eb/theranos-founder-elizabeth-holmes-comes-from-a-bakers-yeastempire.
180. See Sara Ashley O’Brien, HBO Theranos Documentary Goes Inside the Secretive, Failed Company,
CNN: BUS. (Mar. 12, 2019, 12:27 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/11/tech/the-inventor-theranosdocumentary/index.html (“She was celebrated as a female founder success story and often graced the cover of
magazines.”).
181. See id.
182. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality, “Multidimensionality,” and the
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 288 (2001) (describing
intersectionality as “recogniz[ing] the multidimensional and complex nature of subordination”).
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which she was able to leverage to push her company forward. The argument here
is that her whiteness and wealthy connections played a larger role in her story
than her gender and that her race and class helped her to overcome the challenges
raised by her gender and, in fact, the multi-dimensional aspect of her story
contributed to her popularity and praise.183 The fact that she was a woman only
helped her to raise money and to continue to receive funding for her company.
She used feminist and gendered language when it benefited her, 184 and then
fashioned herself in Steve Jobs’ image and lowered the register of her voice at
other times to appear more masculine. 185 Elizabeth Holmes’ success can be
explained by her multidimensionality and the power dynamics of three
important identities: race, class, and gender.186 Although she is a woman and
women in entrepreneurship are rare, she is a white woman who counted herself
among the upper class. The import of this is that any experience of
entrepreneurship by her as an underrepresented minority is arguably trumped by
the position afforded her in society by her race and class and raises the possibility
that her race and class afforded her the privilege of avoiding discrimination
based on gender. 187 She was able to expertly leverage her racial and class
privileges to overcome any ill effects of gender discrimination. In effect, her role
as a wealthy, white woman in Silicon Valley is marginal diversity, and a form
of tokenism at best.188
Juxtaposing her experience against entrepreneurs of color in Silicon
Valley, there is a stark difference between Holmes’ experience of
entrepreneurship and that of entrepreneurs of color. Entrepreneurs of color face
systematic challenges to being a minority or an outsider to an insider’s club. The
difficulties of fundraising are multi-dimensional and may include lack of social
capital, access to a network, or any means to backchannel feedback or insider
information when fundraising.189 In Holmes’ case, her parents gave her $50,000

183. Hanna Hart, What Can Theranos’ Elizabeth Holmes Teach Us About Feminism?, FORBES (Mar. 31,
2019, 6:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hannahart/2019/03/31/womens-history-what-does-theranoselizabeth-holmes-tell-us-or-not-about-feminism/#297c019933f4 (“Her whiteness and wealthy connections
helped her overcome this hurdle [as a woman]. Then, once she acquired critical sponsorship and funding, the
fact that she was a young woman undoubtedly helped create Elizabeth Holmes as a media darling.”).
184. See Kristen Bellstrom, Elizabeth Holmes Hints at Sexism in Media Coverage, FORTUNE (Dec. 10, 2015,
9:42 AM), https://fortune.com/2015/12/10/elizabeth-holmes-sexism-theranos.
185. Hart, supra note 183 (“She relied on the language of gender when it suited her, but set out to emulate
Steve Jobs and amass as much personal power as possible.”).
186. Williams, supra note 23.
187. Id.
188. Tokenism is “the practice of doing something (such as hiring a person who belongs to a minority group)
only to prevent criticism and give the appearance that people are being treated fairly.” Kara Sherrer, What is
Tokenism, and Why Does it Matter in the Workplace?, VANDERBILT UNIV.: BUS. (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://business.vanderbilt.edu/news/2018/02/26/tokenism-in-the-workplace/ (quoting the Merriam Webster
definition of tokenism).
189. Solange Lopes, 5 Challenges Faced by Women Entrepreneurs of Color, ENTREPRENEUR (May 30,
2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/312662.

1484

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1453

from an education trust that they had put aside for her tuition at Stanford.190 She
was given the benefit of the doubt at every turn. She was unfairly propped up by
a system designed to promote a certain class and type of entrepreneur. Holmes’
success in raising capital remains a lesson in the ways that race, privilege, and
wealth dictate startup success. Startup culture along with the private markets
enabled the meteoric rise of Theranos. The closed market system of private
capital in Silicon Valley is the backbone of entrenching homogeneity.191
The lore around her family’s pedigree acted as a form of pattern matching.
The pattern is that investors convinced themselves that they know what elite
success looks like and that it looks like Elizabeth Holmes’ family history. Her
parents were Christian and Noel Holmes. 192 On her father’s side, she is
descended from Charles Louis Fleischmann, a Hungarian immigrant who
founded the Fleischmann Yeast Company. 193 The yeast company’s success
turned Fleischmann’s family into one of the wealthiest families in America.194
Charles’ daughter, Bettie Fleischmann, married Dr. Christian Holmes. Dr.
Holmes was Elizabeth’s great-great-grandfather. 195 He helped to found
Cincinnati General Hospital and the University of Cincinnati Medical School.196
In the context of Theranos and Elizabeth Holmes’ story, much would be made
of Elizabeth’s family tree and her family’s connections.197 Among the media and
her investors, through the connection to entrepreneurship and to medicine, it was
implied that Elizabeth was destined to found Theranos, a medical startup, since
she had inherited both medical and entrepreneurial genes from her grandfather
and great-great-grandfather.198 This logic is essentially dynastic—that children
190. Roper, supra note 19 (“[Holmes] . . . dropped out of Stanford and founded a company called Theranos
with her tuition money.”).
191. Ellen Gamerman, The New High-Tech Patrons, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 28, 2013, 6:49 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323384604578328121811415726.
192. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 9.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 9–10.
195. Id. at 10.
196. See Nathan Hood, Dr. Christian R. Holmes, the Cincinnati General Hospital, and the Surgical
Amphitheater, U. CIN. LIBR.: LIBLOG (July 31, 2015), https://libapps.libraries.uc.edu/liblog/2015/07/drchristian-r-holmes-the-cincinnati-general-hospital-and-the-surgical-amphitheater.
197. For example, Holmes’ next-door neighbor growing up was Richard Fuisz, a noted entrepreneur and
medical inventor. He is a true Renaissance man; he is a licensed doctor, was possibly a CIA agent, and he makes
a successful living from royalties from licensing patents. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 56, 60.
198. See Interview by Sally Smith Hughes with Donald L. Lucas, supra note 179. Describing Elizabeth
Holmes, Lucas said:
She had no background in business, and so it’s quite presumptuous for somebody to say, ‘I’m going
to be president of the company.’ But there’s an important distinction. That’s what I felt when I
[first] met her. After spending a lot more time with her, I learned her great-grandfather was an
entrepreneur and started Fleischmann’s—packaged yeast. It was very successful. So that was one
side, that’s the entrepreneur side, but she was in the medical side. Ah! It turns out later, the hospital
very near where they lived is named after her great uncle who was involved with medicine. So she
came by both of the two talents necessary here, one medicine and the other entrepreneurship, quite
naturally. You could just see it the way she handles things, the way she thinks.
Id.; see also Makalintal, supra note 179.
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of elites are presumptively worthy of access to capital and leadership
positions.199
For Holmes in particular, her pedigree also created a bit of a mystique about
her and fed into her cult of personality. In the HBO documentary film The
Inventor, Theranos chairman Don Lucas said that he knew that when he met
Holmes, then a twenty-two-year-old startup founder, she “came by it naturally”
(because her ancestor was an entrepreneur and her great-great-grandfather a
famous doctor).200 This statement seems to convey that to Don Lucas, it was her
bloodline, not her work, that mattered to him as he considered an investment.201
In fact, her pedigree and not necessarily her product is why Don Lucas invested
in the company.202
Further, Board member George Shultz referred to Holmes as “the next
Steve Jobs or Bill Gates” in a Wall Street Journal interview. 203 This article
spawned the next wave of funding and sparked the $6 billion valuation. In 2014,
she made a claim that she was developing a $100 million partnership with the
U.S. Defense Department.204 There was no evidence to this claim, but it was
reported on and repeated.205 This focus on the cult of personality, the idea that
she might be the “next Steve Jobs or Bill Gates” gave her cover for her fraudulent

199. See Henry Farrell, David Brooks Has a Point—Upper Class Kids Have Invisible Cultural Advantages,
WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 11, 2017, 8:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2015/09/23/why-are-working-class-kids-less-likely-to-get-elite-jobs-they-study-too-hard-at-college
(providing a statement from Lauren Rivera, Associate Professor at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School
of Management) (“Whether intentionally or not, elite parents expose their children to different experiences and
styles of interacting that are useful for getting ahead in society. Many of these are taken for granted in upper and
upper-middle class circles, such as how to prepare a college application (and having cultivated the right types of
accomplishments to impress admissions officers), how to network in a business setting in a way that seems
natural, and how to develop rapport with teachers, interviewers, and other gatekeepers to get things you want
from those in power. Basically, if we think of economic inequality as a sporting competition, elite parents give
their kids a leg up, not only by being able to afford the equipment necessary to play but also by teaching them
the rules of the game and giving them insider tips on how to win.”); see also David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise:
The New Upper Class Rules and How They Got There, 33 STAN. CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY 304 (2000),
https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/media/_media/pdf/key_issues/elites_journalism.pdf (exploring
the generational rise of elites through the descriptions of brides and grooms in the New York Times weddings
page).
200. The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley, supra note 24.
201. Id.
202. See Eliana Dockterman, Elizabeth Holmes Got Where She Was Through Privilege. A New
Documentary About Her Doesn’t See That, TIME (Mar. 14, 2019, 6:16 AM), https://time.com/5551319/theinventor-documentary-review (“The men she hustled were probably seduced by her pedigree; in the film,
Theranos chairman Don Lucas says that he knew Holmes, then a 22-year-old startup founder, ‘came by it
naturally’ because her great-grandfather was an entrepreneur and her great-uncle a famous doctor—as if her
bloodline, not her work, was what mattered.”); see also Gompers et al., supra note 107.
203. Joseph Rago, Elizabeth Holmes: The Breakthrough of Instant Diagnosis, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-holmes-the-breakthrough-of-instant-diagnosis-1378526813.
204. United States v. Holmes, No. 5:18-CR-00258-EJD, 2020 WL 666563, at *2, *13 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11,
2020); see also Press Release, supra note 31.
205. Press Release, supra note 31 (“In truth, Theranos’ technology was never deployed by the U.S.
Department of Defense and generated a little more than $100,000 in revenue from operations in 2014.”).
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claims because she was essentially vouched for time and time again by a member
of the elite startup world.
This type of fundraising culture is what propelled Theranos to such success
in raising capital. The normalized practice of founders obscuring facts and
inflating claims in pursuit of fundraising capital played deeply in Elizabeth
Holmes’ favor. Patrick O’Neill, the media and ad representative from Chiat\Day,
the company Theranos hired for publicity, described his experience with
Theranos in an interview stating that “all tech startups were chaotic and
secretive.”206 Despite the chaos and secrecy or the fact that her product did not
work, Holmes was able to successfully fundraise. Knowing what we now know
about the failure of the Theranos product, the fact that she was able to raise
money in record-breaking numbers is an indictment of the vaporware culture
described above. Because of the lack of evidence of her experience and
expertise, one can only draw the conclusion that the intrigue of her story, along
with her race, background, and connections, propelled her forward absent
concrete factual projections.207 The company ultimately raised $700 million in
the private market from investors who committed capital often without
reviewing audited financial statements, taking the company to a peak valuation
of $9 billion.208 This method of fundraising based on vaporware has the effect
of reinforcing structural racism. The presumptions against people of color
function much differently than with white founders. 209 Through this lens,
vaporware is another way to demonstrate the closed system that will vouch for
white founders even when their product doesn’t work.
The allure of Theranos was that it was a seemingly innovative company
with a mission to disrupt the diagnostic lab industry by providing low-cost blood
testing services. The hype around the startup was that the company was making
a major breakthrough in the large blood-testing market, where the U.S.
diagnostic-lab industry posts annual sales of over $70 billion. 210 Theranos
claimed its technology was revolutionary because it had developed devices to
automate and miniaturize blood tests using microscopic blood volumes.211 The
company’s tests required only about 1/100 to 1/1,000 of the amount of blood
that would ordinarily be needed and cost far less than existing tests.212 Theranos
206. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 160.
207. See Kitanya Harrison, Elizabeth Holmes and the Dangers of White Feminism, MEDIUM (Mar. 22,
2019),
https://medium.com/@kitanyaharrison/elizabeth-holmes-and-the-dangers-of-white-feminism699cfe6333a3 (opining that Holmes took advantage of her identity to grain traction for her startup).
208. Francine McKenna, The Last Days of Theranos—The Financials Were as Overhyped as the Blood
Tests, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 20, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-last-days-oftheranos-the-financials-were-as-overhyped-as-the-blood-tests-2018-10-16.
209. See, e.g., Courtney Rubin, What It’s Like to Be a Black Entrepreneur Right Now, MARKER (June 16,
2020), https://marker.medium.com/what-its-like-to-be-a-black-entrepreneur-right-now-509373dee85a.
210. Nickie Louise, Theranos Is Finally Shutting Down After Investors Lost Nearly $1 Billion,
TECHSTARTUPS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://techstartups.com/2018/09/05/theranos-finally-shutting-investors-lostnearly-1-billion.
211. Rago, supra note 203.
212. See Parloff, supra note 9.
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dubbed its blood collection vessel the “nanotainer” and its analysis machine the
“Edison.”213 The company’s mission was compelling to investors because blood
draws are painful, costly, and time consuming, and many patients want results
quickly.
Elizabeth Holmes traded on the theme of disruption and innovation.
Theranos’ marketing and Holmes’ pitch capitalized on the idea that Theranos’
technology would revolutionize the staid blood-testing market. In fact, its
vaunted technology turned out to be a sham and, in reality, Theranos performed
tests using competitors’ machines. In interviews, Holmes underscored that
“Theranos’ proprietary technology could take a pinprick’s worth of blood,
extracted from the tip of a finger, instead of intravenously, and test for hundreds
of diseases—a remarkable innovation that was going to save millions of lives
and, in a phrase that [Elizabeth Holmes] often repeated, ‘change the world.’”214
The theme of changing the world was what investors, partners, and employees
interviewed after the fact would say had lured them in to the company.215
Before the sham was revealed, the claims of innovation and revolutionizing
blood testing, with little or no documented evidence to support the claims, were
enough to persuade former Safeway CEO Steven Burd to partner with
Theranos. 216 In 2012, Safeway invested $350 million into retrofitting 800
Safeway locations with clinics that would offer in-store blood tests. However,
after many missed deadlines and questionable results from a trial clinic at
Safeway’s corporate offices, the deal was called off in 2015.217
In September 2013, Theranos also partnered with Walgreens to offer instore blood tests at more than forty Walgreens locations with plans to expand its
“wellness centers” across the United States.218 Like Safeway, Walgreens wanted
in on innovation and Walgreens’ senior executives pushed through the deal with

213. Norman A. Paradis, The Rise and Fall of Theranos, SCI. AM. (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-rise-and-fall-of-theranos/.
214. Bilton, supra note 164.
215. See Monica Torres, 4 Ways Elizabeth Holmes Manipulated Her Theranos Employees, HUFFPOST (Mar.
22, 2019, 12:57 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/elizabeth-holmes-office-employees_l_5c92abe3e4
b01b140d351b6f.
216. See John Carreyrou, From Startup to Meltdown: The Unraveling of Theranos, WHARTON (July 17,
2018), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-secrets-and-lies-that-sunk-theranos (explaining that
Holmes courted Burd for the partnership before he retired in 2013, but the executives that succeeded him were
more skeptical about Theranos).
217. Carreyrou, supra note 166. A sad coda to this story is that of the Safeway Vice President, whose
husband had cancer. She greenlit the Theranos partnership in part because she was hopeful that the company
would help millions of people suffering with illness. David Shaywitz, Learning the Right Lesson from Theranos:
Fraud Is Bad, Wanting to Disrupt Healthcare Isn’t, FORBES (June 4, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/davidshaywitz/2018/06/04/learning-the-right-lesson-from-theranos-fraud-is-bad-wanting-to-disrupthealthcare-isnt/?sh=2337c76b60c7.
218. See John Soat, Walgreens CIO: We Intend to Be a Leader in Healthcare Technology, FORBES (Nov.
17, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/2014/11/17/walgreens-cio-we-intend-to-be-a-leaderin-healthcare-technology/#44223bca543e.
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Theranos under pressure to best CVS’ minute clinic.219 Walgreens executives
ignored the private consultant’s warnings and concerns based on the assurances
of Holmes’ Board. The same phenomenon occurred with the Safeway
decisionmakers.220 Holmes had an uncanny ability to bring people in and get
them to believe that Theranos’ technology could completely revolutionize how
effective health care is delivered. She was able to draw people in—investors,
board members, employees, and partners—based off the strength of her claims
of changing the world.221 The real story, however, was a little more complicated.
In addition to her success stemming from investors compelled by her narrative
of revolutionizing the medical industry, Holmes’ connections, her cultural
capital, and the overall startup culture of deception were also reasons for
Theranos’ success.
The next Part describes the private markets’ role in protecting founders and
propelling star companies forward and how the private fundraising market
perpetuates the racial wealth gap and mirrors the structural barriers and
inequities in larger society. Taken together, the fundraising culture and the
private market’s role combine to entrench mostly white men over any other
group when it comes to dominating the startup market.

II. THE MODEL UNICORN TURNS BAD: THE PRIVATE MARKET’S ROLE
The private investment market is the wealthy and influential sector
responsible for crowning unicorns.222 In the private markets, investors are often
given equity in startup companies in exchange for funding.223 These investors
include venture capital investors, angel investors, and individual investors that
219. See Amelia Lucas, Ex-Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes ‘Really Did Believe’ She Was Helping the
World, Bad Blood Author Says, CNBC (Aug. 22, 2018, 7:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/22/extheranos-ceo-holmes-believed-she-was-helping-the-world-author-says.html (providing a statement from
Carreyrou that “[Walgreens was] so afraid that Theranos would turn around and strike a deal with their rival,
their arch-rival, CVS that they just ignored their own in-house consultant,” who alerted Walgreens of his
suspicions in late 2010).
220. James Markarian, How to Avoid Making Catastrophic Innovation Bets, VENTUREBEAT (June 8, 2019,
12:12 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/06/08/how-to-avoid-making-catastrophic-innovation-bets (“By the
time Theranos had been exposed as a sham, Safeway had dumped $350 million into the partnership—nearly half
of its net income in 2012—and built clinics in over 800 stores.”).
221. See How a Silicon Valley Breakthrough Failed the Basic Test of Innovation, CHICAGO TRIB. (June 13,
2016, 4:40 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-theranos-walgreen-holmes-edit-0614md-20160613-story.html (mentioning Holmes’ persuasive salesmanship).
222. Davide Scigliuzzo, Kelsey Butler & Sally Bakewell, Everything Is Private Equity Now, BLOOMBERG:
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 8, 2019, 1:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-10-03/how-privateequity-works-and-took-over-everything (“The business [of private equity] has made billionaires out of many of
its founders. Funds have snapped up businesses from pet stores to doctors’ practices to newspapers. PE firms
may also be deep into real estate, loans to businesses, and startup investments—but the heart of their craft is
using debt to acquire companies and sell them later.”).
223. James Chen, Private Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp
(Apr. 30, 2020) (“Private equity is composed of funds and investors that directly invest in private companies, or
that engage in buyouts of public companies, resulting in the delisting of public equity. Institutional and retail
investors provide the capital for private equity, and the capital can be utilized to fund new technology, make
acquisitions, expand working capital, and to bolster and solidify a balance sheet.”).

May 2021]

RACE AND EQUITY IN THE AGE OF UNICORNS

1489

may have a connection to the founders.224 Generally, the general public is not
eligible to invest in the private market because private companies are not
publicly traded. As a result, access to the private investment market is, in most
cases, restricted because of the federal securities laws. The import of this
restriction is that wealthy, elite private actors carry the bulk of the influence with
respect to entrepreneurship. In protecting the public from themselves, the
resulting effect of the federal securities laws is that monied and connected
individuals have an outsized advantage and control with respect to
entrepreneurship.225
For the reasons described above in Part I related to lack of diversity,
heuristics, and the brilliant founder myth, access to capital to launch a startup is
often limited to those that are of a certain type. As a result, the private markets
reinforce the existing structures of wealth inequality. While the federal securities
laws focus on investor protection, accountability, and disclosure, the proxies
used by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) bar access by
communities of color to private financial markets. The objective standard used
by the SEC of using wealth as a proxy for sophistication has the effect of being
both “under protective of wealthy investors and over protective of non-wealthy
investors.”226 These race neutral regulations effectively bar most communities
of color from participating in the private markets and therefore in “opportunities
to create generational wealth through entrepreneurship and investing,” also
leaving founders of color underfunded.227
One of the problems with the private financial markets is that the
exemptions from registration under the federal securities laws function to restrict
participants to a small, insular class of mostly white investors. 228 Funding
streams to entrepreneurs mirror where the wealth already exists, resulting in
white male entrepreneurs receiving the majority of startup funding. This has
resulted in disparity in capital raising between founders of color and white
224. See Cremades, supra note 89 (differentiating between the types of investors that fund startups).
225. Musa Al-Gharbi, The 1 Percent Wins Again: How Entrepreneurship—Supposedly the Cornerstone of
American Society—Favors the Wealthy, SALON (Mar. 20, 2016, 7:59 PM), https://www.salon.com/2016/03/20/
the_1_percent_wins_again_how_the_wealthy_have_all_the_advantages_for_starting_new_businesses/;
see
Alice Marwick, Silicon Valley Isn’t a Meritocracy. And It’s Dangerous to Hero-Worship Entrepreneurs, WIRED
(Nov. 25, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/11/silicon-valley-isnt-a-meritocracy-and-the-cult-ofthe-entrepreneur-holds-people-back (“[A] level of material wealth is necessary to participate in San Francisco
tech culture. . . . To forge the type of social connections necessary to move into the upper echelons of the tech
scene requires being able to take part in group activities, travel to conferences, and work on personal projects.
This requires middle- to upper-class wealth, which filters out most people.”).
226. Kevin G. Bender, Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the Federal Securities
Laws Facilitate Wealth Inequality, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 4 (2016).
227. Mariah Lichtenstern, Investors Still Engage in Racist Redlining. Why Haven’t We Done Something
About It?, FORTUNE (Jan. 6, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/01/06/redlining-black-latinxentrepreneurship-investment-sec/; see also Bender, supra note 226, at 3–4.
228. See Lyons-Padilla et al., supra note 133, at 17225 (explaining that white men control more than 98.7%
of global financial assets and that “[o]f the $69.1 trillion global financial assets under management across mutual
funds, hedge funds, real estate, and private equity, fewer than 1.3% are managed by women and people of
color”).
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founders, which has developed over time.229 This disparity in access to capital
affects all methods of capital raising for entrepreneurs.230
A. PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTIONS, THE WEALTH GAP, AND THE FALLACY
OF BOOTSTRAPPING
Startup financing typically occurs through three investor types—friends
and family investors, angel investors and venture capital investors—conducted
through private offerings. Typically, “friends and family” rounds are
investments from individuals willing to invest their own money ordinarily up to
$150,000.231 The reference to “friends and family” is because these investors
usually have a personal relationship with the founders; the investor believes in
the startup idea or the founder and would probably not make the investment but
for her relationship with the founder.
After friends and family, there are angel investments, which are
investments of up to $2 million typically by wealthy individuals who are either
entrepreneurs themselves or otherwise have experience investing in early-stage
companies.232 Angel investors may or may not have a personal relationship with
the founders, but investment by angel investors is heavily relationship driven.233
Angel investors typically use their personal funds, which gives them flexibility
to use nonfinancial as well as financial reasons to invest. They make their
investment decision based on seeking a return on their investment and having
the opportunity to mentor a startup founder. Angel investors usually bridge the
gap between the friends and family round and venture capital rounds.234 Angels
play an important role in developing startups and as a mechanism for sorting
new startups that later seek venture capital.235 “Sorting” or screening is often
229. As a startup lawyer directing an entrepreneurship and community development clinic at Columbia Law
School, I’ve worked with underrepresented entrepreneurs in several jurisdictions; I know first-hand how
fundraising works and the challenges faced by entrepreneurs of color.
230. See Robert Fairlie, Alicia Robb & David T. Robinson, Black and White: Access to Capital Among
Minority-Owned Startups (Stan. Inst. for Econ. Pol’y Rsch., Discussion Paper No. 17-03, 2016),
https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/17-003.pdf (“Black-owned businesses are persistently
smaller and face more difficulty in raising external capital. Large differences in credit worthiness are important
for explaining the difference. Even controlling for credit worthiness, persistent differences in perceptions of
treatment by banks are also important. Spatial variation in banking conditions and historical attitudes towards
race are consistent with racial bias.”).
231. How to Raise a Friends and Family Round, FOUNDER INST. (Mar. 22, 2019), https://fi.co/insight/howto-raise-a-friends-and-family-round (“A Friends and Family round typically results in anywhere from $10,000
to $150,000 in funding that allows a startup to get through its first few months of operation.”).
232. Anne Field, What Is an Angel Investor? Who They Are, What They Do, and How They Help Startups
Grow, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 12, 2020, 7:45 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-an-angel-investor
(“Angel investors generally are high-net-worth individuals who provide funding to startups in exchange for
convertible debt (bonds) or equity (shares) in the company. The term is actually borrowed from show
business . . . . Plus, many angel groups co-invest with other angel groups, individual angels, and even early-stage
venture capitalists to make investments of $500,000 to $2 million per round.”).
233. Ibrahim, supra note 93, at 1431 (explaining that angel investors are more likely to invest if they know
the founder and the industry of the startup).
234. Id. at 1428.
235. Id. at 1428–29.
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facilitated at the angel investor level.236 Entrepreneurs signal the strength of their
startup idea by how much angel investment they have in their company, since
“[f]irms which are backed by angel investors are more likely to survive, create
more jobs, and have a greater chance of successfully exiting the startup phase
than otherwise comparable firms without this support.” 237 According to the
Center for Venture Research, total angel investments in 2019 were $23.9 billion,
an increase of 3.2% over 2018, and a total of 63,730 entrepreneurial ventures
received angel funding in 2019.238
Venture capital is a term used to describe risky, speculative investments,
often in early-stage, high-growth technology companies.239 It is a type of private
financing for startups, where the investor, investment bank, or other financial
institution believes that the investment has long-term growth potential.240 The
venture capital firm invests in the startup often by taking a sizable stake in the
business until a certain point when the startup can be sold to another company
or sold on the public-equity markets when the venture capital firm can exit and
get a sizeable return on their investment.241 U.S. venture capital funds set new
records in deal making, exits, and fundraising in 2020, according to a new report
from PitchBook and the National Venture Capital Association. “Deal value
topped $150 billion for the first time, while exit value hit a record $290 billion
after a surge of public listings in the second half of the year. Meanwhile, new
venture capital funds raised $73.6 billion, surpassing the 2018 high of $68.1
billion, according to the report.”242
All three of the above-described investment types implicate the federal
securities laws.

236. According to research by Josh Lerner et al., angels are beneficial to the growth, performance, and
survival of startups, even if they are located in economies that are not friendly to entrepreneurs. Josh Lerner,
Antoinette Schoar, Stanislav Sokolinski & Karen Wilson, The Globalization of Angel Investments: Evidence
Across Countries (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 21808, 2015), https://www.nber.org/
system/files/working_papers/w21808/w21808.pdf. Startups that have angel backing are at least 14% more likely
to survive for eighteen months or more after funding than firms that do not. Id. at 6. Angel-backed firms hire
40% more employees, and angel backing increases the likelihood of successful exit from the startup phase by
10 percent, to 17 percent. Id.
237. Laurent Belsie, How Angel Investors Help Startup Firms, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH. (Mar.
2016), https://www.nber.org/digest/mar16/how-angel-investors-help-startup-firms.
238. JEFFREY SOHL, CTR. FOR VENTURE RSCH., THE ANGEL MARKET IN 2019: COMMITMENTS BY ANGELS
INCREASE WITH A SIGNIFICANT RISE IN DEAL VALUATIONS (2020), https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=cvr.
239. Fan, supra note 9, at 590.
240. Adam Hayes, Venture Capital, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/
venturecapital.asp (Mar. 16, 2021) (“Venture capital (VC) is a form of private equity and a type of financing
that investors provide to startup companies and small businesses that are believed to have long-term growth
potential.”).
241. Zider, supra note 104.
242. Amy Whtye, Venture Capital’s Best Year Ever, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1q3tsrkkdv4m7/Venture-Capital-s-Best-Year-Ever.
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1. The Racial Effect of the Accredited Investor Rules
All private offerings (even those made to friends and family) require
registration with the SEC unless the offering is exempt from registration under
the federal securities laws. 243 Registration with the SEC can be costly and
burdensome.244 As a result, the vast majority of companies choose to find an
exemption from registration.245 The easiest and most common exception to the
registration requirement is the accredited investor rule promulgated under
Regulation D, which creates an exemption for the offering if all investors are
accredited investors.246
Any investment in a private offering is overwhelmingly restricted to
company insiders, institutional investors, and wealthy individuals or “accredited
investors.”247 The SEC created the concept of “accredited investors” to mitigate
the tension in protecting individual investors in private securities offerings and

243. Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under Regulation D, SEC (Sept. 24, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html (“A securities offering exempt
from registration with the SEC is sometimes referred to as a private placement or an unregistered offering.
Under the federal securities laws, a company may not offer or sell securities unless the offering has been
registered with the SEC or an exemption from registration is available.”).
244. SEC, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), https://www.sec.gov/
files/forms-1.pdf (listing all of the requirements for eligibility).
245. “For example, in 2014 only 3.5% of reported securities offerings were public offerings and only a
fraction of those were with the required form S-1. The other 96.5% were offerings made pursuant to an exception
to the registration requirement.” Kyle Hulten, Family and Friends Financing Round: Raising Capital from Non
Accredited Investors, VIGOR L. GRP.: THE CANAL ST. BLOG, https://www.invigorlaw.com/friends-and-familyfinancing-round/ (last visited May 21, 2021).
246. 17 CFR § 230.506 (2020).
247. Under existing Rule 501, a person qualifies as an accredited investor if he or she is either:
Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse,
exceeds $1 million. . . .
[or] who had an income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income
with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year . . . .
Id. § 230.501.
In December 2020, at the time of writing this Article, the SEC adopted amendments to the accredited
investor rule to add new categories of qualifying natural persons and entities and to make certain other
modifications to the existing definition. According to the SEC:
The amendments are intended to update and improve the definition to identify more effectively
investors that have sufficient knowledge and expertise to participate in investment opportunities
that do not have the rigorous disclosure and procedural requirements, and related investor
protections, provided by registration under the Securities Act of 1993.
Order Designating Certain Professional Licenses as Qualifying Natural Persons for Accredited Investor Status,
85 Fed. Reg. 64,234, 64,234 (Oct. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
The amendments allow investors to qualify as accredited investors based on defined measures of
professional knowledge, experience, or certifications in addition to the existing tests for income or
net worth. The amendments also expand the list of entities that may qualify as accredited investors,
including by allowing any entity that meets an investments test to qualify.
Press Release, SEC, SEC Modernizes the Accredited Investor Definition (2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2020-191.
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promoting investment in private offerings to encourage economic growth. 248
Notably, the SEC does not restrict investment in publicly traded companies.249
An “accredited investor” is an individual or an entity that is presumed to not
need the protection of federal or state securities laws based on their income or
net worth.250 In other words, an accredited investor’s financial sophistication
and ability to sustain the risk of loss of investment or ability to fend for
themselves, as evidenced by their wealth, ostensibly renders the protections of
the federal securities laws’ registration process unnecessary. 251 Wealth is
therefore a “proxy for sophistication.”252 Qualifying as an accredited investor is
significant because accredited investors may, under SEC rules, participate in
investment opportunities that are generally not available to non-accredited
investors or “ordinary investors,” such as investments in private companies and
offerings by hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds.253
The SEC’s “accredited investor standard” effectively means that only those
with at least $1 million in assets or $200,000 in annual income can participate
in private offerings.254 Simply put, an accredited investor is someone who is
quite wealthy. Accredited investor status is required for certain investments,
such as angel investments, hedge funds, private equity, and others.255 Because
of the nature of private fundraising mechanisms and exemptions, the accredited
investor standard has the effect of restricting most (87%) Americans from
investment opportunities in Silicon Valley startups, or any startups for that
matter.256 The rules and regulations assume that only well-off individuals can
248. Michael L. Monson, The Evolution and Future of the Accredited Investor Standard for Individuals, 23
UTAH BAR J.. Nov./Dec. 2010, at 36, 38.
249. See Paulina Likos, How to Invest in the Private Market, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 26, 2021, 3:56
PM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-101/articles/how-to-invest-in-the-private-market.
250. Id. at 37.
251. Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, 52 Fed. Reg. 3,015, 3,015–
22 (Jan. 30, 1987) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239) (stating that the accredited investor standard is
“intended to encompass those persons whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of
investment or ability to fend for themselves render the protections of the Securities Act’s registration process
unnecessary.”); see also Fan, supra note 9, at 592 (“The theory behind Regulation D is that accredited investors
are financially sophisticated and therefore do not need the protections of the securities laws.”).
252. Syed Haq, Comment, Revisiting the Accredited Investor Standard, 5 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL
L. REV. 59, 69 (2015); see also Renee M. Jones, Essay, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 66 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
165, 186 (2017).
253. James Garrett Baldwin, How to Become an Accredited Investor, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/092815/how-become-accredited-investor.asp (Dec. 28, 2020)
(“[T]he Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allows companies and private funds to skip the need to
register certain investments as long as the firms sell these assets to accredited investors. Accredited investors are
able to invest money directly into the lucrative world of private equity, private placements, hedge funds, venture
capital, and equity crowdfunding.” (footnote omitted)).
254. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508 (2020).
255. Alexis Rhiannon, Accredited Investors Have Access to Complex, Loosely Regulated Investments—
Here’s What It Takes to Qualify, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2021, 9:12 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
accredited-investor (“[O]nce you become accredited, it ‘unlocks’ access to products not available to the general
public, such as hedge funds, venture capital funds, private equity funds, and angel investing.”).
256. Era Anagnosti, Colin J. Diamond, David Johansen & John R. Vetterli, SEC: Time to Revamp Securities
Offering Exemptions, LEXOLOGY (July 23, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5945214c-
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assess information to evaluate investment and they are sophisticated as
evidenced by their wealth. As of 2015, 13% of households qualified as
accredited investors under Rule 501(a)(6) of Regulation D.257 Of those, only
1.3% are Black and 2.8% are Latinx.258 “For [an entrepreneur] whose networks
are largely rooted in Black and Latinx communities, that means less than 1% of
the people ‘like them’ are allowed to invest freely.” 259 In writing about her
concerns regarding the accredited investor exemption generally, Professor Usha
Rodrigues writes that, “the private and public markets have now grown radically
disconnected and unequal.”260 The reason the SEC originally implemented such
restrictive investor rules is because the SEC likely feared the majority of the
population would be unsophisticated in their investments, sinking their savings
into untested companies and losing money.261 But the justification does not hold
up when you realize that even certified public accountants, people with very high
levels of proven competence and training, might not qualify today as an
accredited investor without satisfying the minimum net worth requirement.262 In
the name of investor protection, the accredited investor rules bar the majority of
communities of color from accessing opportunity for wealth formation.
Very little has been written on how these rules exacerbate racial and
economic inequalities. While the SEC paternalistically attempts to distinguish
between who can fend for themselves and who cannot, the real impact of the
federal securities may be felt in the communities of color who, due to their
economic status, are generally unable to access these markets.263 What is at stake
is equality of opportunity to grow and accumulate wealth. This phenomenon is
a problem because the federal securities laws represent government regulation
that perpetuates the ability for the wealthy to become wealthier and facilitates
inequity in the opportunity to access the private financial markets.
2. General Solicitation
In addition to the accredited investor standard, before 2012 when the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”) was passed, the
f980-4f26-a3ba-fdce62e42ae0; see also PK, How Many Accredited Investors Are There in America? (2016),
DQYDJ (Oct. 7, 2020), https://dqydj.com/2016-accredited-investors-in-america/ (“We estimate in 2016 there
were 12,417,040 Accredited Investor Households in America, 9.86% of all American Households.”).
257. Anagnosti et al., supra note 256.
258. Lichtenstern, supra note 227.
259. Id.
260. Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3413 (2013).
261. Id.
262. Under the new rules, the SEC has determined that those with Series 7, 63, or 83 licenses qualify as
accredited investors based on those licenses alone. See Press Release, supra note 247. Those with CFA and CFP
designations have been considered as have licensed CPAs and attorneys, but ultimately those designations and
licenses were not included in the new rule. Mat Sorensen, SEC Expands Accredited Investor Rule,
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/355590.
263. Leah Duncan, Arbitrary Paternalism and the SEC Accredited-Investor Standard, BLOG: MICH. J. RACE
& L. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://mjrl.org/2018/12/04/arbitrary-paternalism-and-the-sec-accredited-investorstandard.
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federal securities laws prohibited the general solicitation of the public in
securities offerings. 264 Most of the exemptions from registration prohibit
companies from engaging in general solicitation or general advertising—
advertising in newspapers or on the Internet to the public in connection with
securities offerings.265 In other words, before 2012, private companies were only
allowed to raise money from accredited investors and from those whom they had
a substantial pre-existing relationship with or to whom they were introduced via
a registered broker-dealer. The rationale for the ban on general solicitation was
to protect unsophisticated investors from fraud due to lack of information, lack
of education, or problematic disclosures.266
After 2012, the JOBS Act limited the removal of the ban on general
solicitation. Primarily aimed at entrepreneurs seeking capital, the JOBS Act
theoretically increases the ability of small businesses and startups to access
capital and generate jobs through the use of crowdfunding.267 Crowdfunding has
the potential to mitigate some of the disparities between businesses that have
access to capital and those that do not.268 The reality, however, is that investment
crowdfunding is not likely to democratize entrepreneurship. Given the extensive
SEC regulatory requirements, it is unlikely that entrepreneurs will turn to
investment crowdfunding to raise capital. 269 The JOBS Act was enacted to
reduce regulatory burdens and increase initial public offerings (IPOs).
According to Professor Renee Jones, the JOBS Act likely had the opposite effect
and contributed to a new governance problem by “creating a class of
unaccountable unicorns.”270
It is difficult to determine the demographics of accredited investors, but
investors in private and public offerings seem to be in the same category as in
the private equity and venture capital space. In recent years, investment is very

264. Fact Sheet: Proposing Amendments to Private Offering Rules, SEC (July 10, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-124-item3.htm (“In April 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act directs the SEC to remove the prohibition
on general solicitation or general advertising for securities offerings relying on Rule 506 provided that sales are
limited to accredited investors and an issuer takes reasonable steps to verify that all purchasers of the securities
are accredited investors.”).
265. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2020). For calculation purposes, the value of primary residence is excluded.
266. See Erin Griffith, Does General Solicitation Matter for Tech Startups? Not Really, PANDO (July 10,
2013), https://pando.com/2013/07/10/does-general-solicitation-matter-for-tech-startups-not-really.
267. See Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL.
L. REV. 217, 220 (2015).
268. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (2015)
(“[C]rowdfunding can democratize the market for financing speculative companies by inviting ordinary
people—‘digital shareholders’—to make investments that are currently offered solely to accredited (wealthy)
investors.”).
269. See Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, What’s Wrong with Jumpstart(ing) Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act?,
16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 185, 191 (2019) (“[W]hile laudable steps have been taken to democratize the
entrepreneurial ecosystem by implementing crowdfunding, isolated regulation such as the JOBS Act will do
little to support entrepreneurs in their startup ventures, resulting in grave effects on this country’s entrepreneurial
ecosystem.”).
270. Jones, supra note 252, at 170.
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homogenous; venture capitalists, who are accredited investors and often lead the
charge in early-stage investing, are 89% male. 271 According to the National
Venture Capital Association/Deloitte Human Capital Survey, racial and ethnic
groups are underrepresented in the Venture Capital workforce. Only 17%
identified as Asian, with 4% identifying as African American, and 5% as
Latino. 272 It’s against that backdrop that venture capitalists choose their
collaborators at other firms, investing their money side by side and joining the
boards that guide the startups. Most investors specialize in a particular industry
or sector, so potential partners are easy for researchers like us to identify: They
are investing in the same types of deals at around the same time. And “venture
capitalists are far more likely to partner with people if they share their gender or
race.”273 There is a lack of data showing the demographics of investors strictly
involved in private placement.
Based on Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, it seems unlikely that general
solicitation meaningfully increases the percentage of investors of color. The rule
“permits issuers to broadly solicit and generally advertise an offering, provided
that (1) all purchasers in the offering are accredited investors.” This confines
eligible investors to the categories mentioned above. Due to the level of wealth
disparity in our country in relation of race, it is unlikely that the requirements of
general solicitation help increase the percentage of investors of color. This is the
landscape on which startups incubate, operate, and scale on the path to creating
a unicorn. Entrepreneurs are required to raise money in a very insular and
homogenous private investment market. The effect of these rules is economic
exclusion of people of color. Nonaccredited investors miss out on the privilege
of investing in the private market, and entrepreneurs miss out on benefiting from
their potential investment.
3.

The Wealth Gap and Its Implications for Bootstrapping

This country has a profound and seemingly insurmountable wealth gap that
falls along racial lines. “Differences in economic outcomes by race have
persisted for centuries in the United States and continue up to the present day.
For example, in 2016, the median household income of black Americans was
$39,500, compared with $65,000 for non-Hispanic white Americans.” 274
According to the Federal Reserve, in 2016, the median wealth of white families
was ten times the wealth of Black families and eight times that of Latino
families. 275 This wealth gap affects entrepreneurship in profound ways.
271. DELOITTE, supra note 116, at 6.
272. Id. at 8.
273. Paul Gompers & Silpa Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–Aug. 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/the-other-diversity-dividend.
274. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya R. Porter, Race and Economic Opportunity
in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q.J. ECON. 711, 712 (2020) (citations omitted).
275. Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, How Wealth Inequality Has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great
Recession, by Race, Ethnicity and Income, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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Although the numbers are on the rise, successful founders of color are largely
absent in entrepreneurship, citing a lack of access to capital compared to their
white counterparts.276 The wealth disparity has implications for bootstrapping,
the traditional path outside of seeking private investment that entrepreneurs take
toward fundraising.277 The expectation of bootstrapping and relying on friends
and family stems from bias toward wealth. However, when entrepreneurs of
color reach out to their friends and family for the seed capital to initially fund
their venture, they are already behind their white counterparts because of the
wealth and income gap.278 Bootstrapping and fundraising through their social
network is essentially a myth for entrepreneurs of color. With the limits on
generational wealth, it is unlikely that the friends and family of entrepreneurs of
color can invest on the level of their white counterparts.
It is hard for entrepreneurs of color to fundraise as evidenced by how few
founders of color receive private investment. Beyond bootstrapping, minority
women founders make up only 3% of all U.S. angel-backed deals, and minority
men were 13% of all U.S. angel-backed deals in 2019.279 Further, in 2018, just
3% of venture capitalists are Black, 1% are Latinx, and 18% of all venture
capitalists are women.280
White (mostly male) entrepreneurs have more access to capital than any
other group. As of 2017, only sixteen Black women-led companies had raised
over a million dollars in venture capital funding. 281 Capital raised by Black
tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicityand-income.
276. See Kathleen Janus, Funders Must Give Minority Founders a Fair Deal, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 15, 2016,
1:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/15/funders-must-give-minority-founders-a-fair-deal (exploring the
reasons why Black founders receive less than one percent of VC funding).
277. Alejandro Cremades, The Pros and Cons of Bootstrapping Startups, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2019, 7: 53 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alejandrocremades/2019/01/13/the-pros-and-cons-of-bootstrappingstartups/#475be957273d (“Bootstrapping a startup means starting lean and without the help of outside capital.
It means continuing to fuel growth internally from cash flow produced by the business. Many sizable businesses
started out bootstrapping. Some have just made it happen on their own. Others have eventually taken offers of
outside investment.”).
278. See KIM PARKER, JULIANA HOROWITZ & BRIAN MAHL, PEW RSCH. CTR., ON VIEWS OF RACE AND
INEQUALITY, BLACKS AND WHITES ARE WORLDS APART 24 (2016), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/06/
27/1-demographic-trends-and-economic-well-being (click “Complete Report PDF” to download) (highlighting
the wealth disparity between Black and white families, revealing a difficulty for black entrepreneurs to receive
funding from family members) (“In 2013, the net worth of white households was $144,200, roughly 13 times
that of black households, according to Pew Research Center analysis of data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey
of Consumer Finances.”).
279. ANGEL RES. INST. & PITCHBOOK, HALO REPORT: ANNUAL REPORT ON ANGEL INVESTMENTS 15 (2020),
https://angelresourceinstitute.org/reports/HALO-2019-%20October-2020-Update.pdf.
280. Richard Kerby, Where Did You Go to School?, NOTEWORTHY—THE J. BLOG (July 30, 2018),
https://blog.usejournal.com/where-did-you-go-to-school-bde54d846188.
281. See DIGITALUNDIVIDED, THE STATE OF BLACK WOMEN FOUNDERS: PROJECTDIANE 2018, at 3 (2018)
(on file with author). In 2018, this number grew to thirty-four Black female founders, and in 2020, ninety-three
Black female founders secured $1 million in investor backing. Emma Hinchliffe, The Number of Black Female
Founders Who Have Raised More Than $1 Million Has Nearly Tripled Since 2018, FORTUNE (Dec. 2, 2020,
10:39 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/12/02/black-women-female-founders-venture-capital-funding-vc-2020project-diane.
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women represented 0.06% of the $424.7 billion in total venture funding raised
since 2009, and a majority of that funding was raised in 2017.282 Juxtapose this
with Elizabeth Holmes, who took her college tuition money from her parents
and leveraged that trust fund to make her first million.283 Holmes had access to
all kinds of accredited investors in her network. One of her first investors, for
example, Tim Draper, of famed venture capital firm Draper Fisher Jurvetson,
was a family friend.284 This Subpart described how the structures of financing
restrict access to the rich, white and privileged. The next Subpart describes how
cultural capital creates circles of power among the wealthy and elite.
B. CULTURAL CAPITAL
Financial capital is a big part of startup success, but so is a form of hidden
capital or cultural capital. Cultural capital is the background, occupation, gender,
age, education, or other aspect about a person that gives them access to certain
social groups or status.285 Accessing cultural capital can lead to opportunities
and advantages gained for possessing cultural capital.286 Entrepreneurs often
have success because they are able to tap into this cultural capital.287 Beyond
financial capital, cultural capital shapes the entrepreneurship game and
influences who achieves success and who does not. The hidden nature of cultural
capital means that some groups benefit unfairly from possessing it when others
do not. In Silicon Valley, whiteness and maleness are undeniable assets. If an
entrepreneur happens to be white, male, wealthy, and college-educated, cultural
capital will probably get that entrepreneur in front of more venture capitalists
and investors than an entrepreneur who is not all of those things. If that
entrepreneur attended Harvard or Stanford, then that entrepreneur has even more
access to cultural capital than most.288 Richard Kerby found that in a study of
about 1,500 venture investors, forty percent of venture investors attended
Stanford or Harvard.289 The implications of this are complicated. There is danger
282. DIGITALUNDIVIDED, supra note 281, at 3.
283. Auletta, supra note 151.
284. The Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley, supra note 24.
285. Annette Lareau & Elliot B. Weininger, Cultural Capital in Educational Research: A Critical
Assessment, 32 THEORY & SOC’Y 567, 570–73 (2003) (discussing dominant interpretations of cultural capital).
286. See CHRIS RABB, INVISIBLE CAPITAL: HOW UNFORESEEN FORCES SHAPE ENTREPRENEURIAL
OPPORTUNITY 93 (2010).
287. Malgorzata A. Wdowiak, Erich J. Schwarz, Robert J. Breitenecker & Richard W. Wright, Linking the
Cultural Capital of the Entrepreneur and Early Performance of New Ventures: A Cross-Country Comparison,
17 J. E. EUROPEAN MGMT. STUD. 149, 149 (2012) (finding that entrepreneurial performance in new ventures is
culture-driven).
288. See PITCHBOOK, UNIVERSITIES REPORT 4 (2016–17 ed.), https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/20162017-pitchbook-universities; Lydia Belanger, You’re More Likely to Get Startup Funding If You Went to One of
These Schools, YAHOO!NEWS (Sept. 9, 2016), https://nz.news.yahoo.com/amphtml/news/youre-more-likelystartup-funding-154500508.html (“Taking into account the number of entrepreneurs and companies a school has
produced, as well as the amount of venture capital its undergraduate alumni have raised, PitchBook’s primary
ranking puts Stanford University at number one. The Silicon Valley university has produced 1,006 entrepreneurs
who have raised more than $18.1 billion.”).
289. Kerby, supra note 280.
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in the idea that a handful of universities, alums, and affiliates control the startup
economy. This phenomenon makes startup culture a closed community for a
certain brand of endorsed elites.290 The money and power are flowing among
people who already have it.291
Cultural capital is born out of systemic racial and social inequality. The use
of cultural capital “illuminates how the rich and well connected occupy different
strata of life, enjoy a completely different set of opportunities from the rest of
us, experience a different kind of justice, and are so often immune from
consequences.”292 The problem with capitalizing on cultural capital is that there
is little vetting that occurs when you take advantage of these relationships. The
next Subpart describes how the market incentivizes racism among the actors in
the financial system.
C. MARKET INCENTIVES DRIVE RACIST AND CLASSIST OUTCOMES
Defenders of Silicon Valley culture may raise several counterarguments
about the central premise of this Article. These arguments may include that
current norms are optimally designed to incent innovation; that some founders
truly are visionaries that improve society even if they create toxic work
environments; that the market is the most efficient way to allocate resources and
should consider distributional equity; and finally, that the lack of diversity in
Silicon Valley is merely a pipeline problem. Yet, there are many examples of
the ways that a lack of representation of communities of color in the startup
space is connected to structural racism. Brief and explicit engagement with these
arguments may help convince the reader that a deeper problem lies within the
culture of Silicon Valley itself. This Article specifically references Silicon
Valley, but the themes discussed in this Article have implications beyond a
critique of Silicon Valley. Fundamentally, this critique of a purported
meritocracy can be applied to every place in society that says it operates as a
meritocracy—for example, college admissions, tech company workplaces, and
even legal academia. The larger lesson to be drawn from Theranos is that we
need to care about these issues in Silicon Valley, not just for the health of our
economy, but for the health of society.
Economic racism shuts out communities of color from startup investment
opportunities. Ventures owned by people of color lack sufficient funding,
typically due to lack of access to venture capital and/or small business loans.293
290. Yu, supra note 6; see Hennessey, supra note 6 (“[Elitism] is found too often among entrepreneurs,
particularly in tech startups. The myopia, the drive that fuels people to take risks, often creates great companies
and great products, but it also cultivates a solipsism that assumes the work the entrepreneur is doing, and the
way in which that work is being done, is the only important undertaking in the world.”).
291. HWANG ET AL., supra note 61.
292. Asher-Schapiro, supra note 38.
293. In a Kauffman Foundation analysis of a 2014 Census Bureau survey, 28.4% of Black entrepreneurs
reported that their profits were hurt by lack of access to capital, compared with 10.1% of white entrepreneurs.
ALICIA ROBB & ARNOBIO MORELIX, KAUFFMAN FOUND., STARTUP FINANCING TRENDS BY RACE: HOW ACCESS
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Underfunding limits a business’ ability to launch, scale, and grow. Limitations
on fundraising and access to capital is one part of the problem.294 But the system
in place for creating and supporting entrepreneurs favors white males at the
outset.
There is deep bias within the Silicon Valley community that manifests as
racism. The economic racism experienced by entrepreneurs of color is not likely
to be addressed, since it occurs in the private market space.295 There is no legal
strategy to ensure that people of color have an equal opportunity to share in
wealth creation. In fact, fighting economic discrimination is a difficult legal
battle. The facts underlying the case in Comcast Corp. v. National Association
of African American-Owned Media is analogous here. In that case, Byron Allen,
who is Black and the founder of Entertainment Studios, sued cable television
companies Comcast and Charter after the providers refused to carry Allen’s
channels.296 Allen alleged claims of racial discrimination under § 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act,297 which, among other things, gives all races an equal right to
make and enforce contracts.298 The statute also requires proving that defendants
were not just biased, but intentionally racist. 299 In its complaint, Allen’s
company, Entertainment Studios, presented specific factual allegations
CAPITAL IMPACTS PROFITABILITY 6 (2016), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
ase_brief_startup_financing_by_race.pdf.
294. See RATEMYINVESTOR, supra note 58, at 8 (showing that only one percent of VC money goes to
companies founded by Black entrepreneurs).
295. According to a recent report by the Washington Post:
TO

More than a dozen black entrepreneurs, most of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity for
fear of retribution, said in interviews that deeply ingrained racism plays a role in the low levels of
funding for black entrepreneurs. Several entrepreneurs described being mistaken for delivery
workers when they arrived for scheduled pitch meetings with venture capitalists. In one group of
black tech employees who share stories online, an entrepreneur described being asked by a venture
capitalist to “tone down the black.”
Reed Albergetti, Black Start-Up Founders Say Venture Capitalists Are Racist, but the Law Protects Them,
WASH. POST (July 22, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/22/blackentrepreneurs-venture-capital/.
296. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013 (2020).
297. Id. This law, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits discrimination against African Americans and
other people of color in employment, housing, banking, consumer transactions, and in all other contractual
relationships.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. First, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (which contained the original version of the law
now codified at § 1981) proclaimed “[t]hat all persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States.” Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1981) (emphasis added). Second, the Act specifically defined the rights of American citizenship:
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
299. See Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1019.

May 2021]

RACE AND EQUITY IN THE AGE OF UNICORNS

1501

supporting its claim that Comcast was motivated by racial discrimination in
refusing to carry Entertainment Studios’ channels.300 The question before the
Supreme Court was whether, in addition to pleading that racial discrimination
was a “motivating factor” for Comcast’s conduct, Entertainment Studios also
had to plead that Comcast’s racial discrimination was the but-for cause of its
denial of a contract right to Entertainment Studios.301 Comcast argued that Allen
must prove Entertainment Studios would have earned the contract, were it not
for race.302 The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Comcast and rejected
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s approach that it was sufficient to
allege that race was a “motivating factor” for the denial of the contract, in favor
of a “but-for” test for causation.303 As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recognized
in her concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the but-for test
“demand[s] the impossible.”304
The Comcast ruling has implications not only for entrepreneurs in Silicon
Valley alleging discrimination, but for future civil rights litigation. There is now
an even higher standard to prove racial discrimination in Silicon Valley. Instead
of considering the statistical evidence that reveals the racial disparity for Black
entrepreneurs, courts will more likely weigh their decisions based on a
hypothetical situation in which the plaintiff’s racial identity is erased and all
other factors remain the same. This dangerously narrows the interpretation of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.305 Silicon Valley investors and leaders will rely on
the heightened standard when facing a claim of discrimination from
entrepreneurs of color.
D. THERANOS HIGHLIGHTS STRUCTURAL BIAS AND INEQUALITY IN THE
PRIVATE MARKET SYSTEM
The story of Theranos provides an opportunity to examine the ways that
cultural capital influences entrepreneurship. Elizabeth Holmes held tremendous
amounts of cultural capital that she was able to leverage in order to catapult her
company into a unicorn. The idea that a nineteen-year-old college dropout with
very limited chemical engineering training and no medical training could invent
something as game-changing as what Theranos claimed it had done defies belief.
But Elizabeth Holmes was believed. Not only was she believed, but she was
300. Id. at 1014.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1013.
303. Id. at 1014–15.
304. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wex S.
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 67 (1956)).
305. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Major Step Backwards for Civil Rights: Comcast v. National Association
of African American-Owned Media, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/a-major-step-backwards-forcivil-rights-comcast-v-national-association-of-african-american-owned-media/ (last visited May 21, 2021)
(“Obviously, the Court’s decision in Comcast will make it more difficult for § 1981 plaintiffs to withstand a
motion to dismiss and ultimately to prevail. Alleging and proving but-for causation is much harder than alleging
and proving that race was a motivating factor in the denial of the contract.”).
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revered as a once-in-a-generation genius. One of the reasons why no one was
skeptical of her is because she had tapped into her cultural capital and was
vouched for by a trusted friend. It is also worth emphasizing here that Holmes
made herself and indeed was the face and a key gatekeeper at Theranos. This
was not an instance where someone with the connections, financial backing, and
managerial skills worked to build bridges and bring the requisite expertise in the
room. She, along with Balwani, cast themselves and indeed operated as the
experts in the room.
There has been some commentary that Theranos’ Board and investors were
seduced by Elizabeth Holmes because she was a young, beautiful woman,306 but
I would argue that if they were seduced at all, they were likely seduced by her
Stanford pedigree. Many of the company’s Board members and investors were
fellows at the Hoover Institute, former cabinet members, and military officers,
including George Shultz, James Mattis, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, Sam
Nunn, and Gary Roughead.307 They all had some type of connection to Stanford
University.308
Stanford University has produced more unicorn founders than any other
university and to this day continues to play a large role in creating unicorns.309
A connection to Stanford carries significant cultural capital and connections to
the elite, monied, influential actors within Silicon Valley.310 Elizabeth Holmes,
who was not even a Stanford graduate, but a dropout, was able to tap into the
incredible resources of the Stanford entrepreneurial ecosystem and gain access

306. See, e.g., Leah Garchik, Money, Medicine and a Good-Looking Woman: The Fall of Theranos, S.F.
CHRON. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/leahgarchik/article/Money-medicine-and-a-goodlooking-woman-the-13687000.php (“Holmes is a glamorous young woman, whose intense blue-eyed stare (she
never blinked, said a Theranos employee) and trademark black turtlenecks were much admired in Silicon Valley.
This, it was agreed upon in a panel discussion that followed the showing [of the Theranos HBO documentary],
was part of the lure for investors and board members, most of whom—George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Rupert
Murdoch among them—were older men, seduced not only by her self-proclaimed genius but also by her youth
and looks.”).
307. Richard Beales, How Theranos Hoovered up $9 Bln of Influence, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2015),
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS334041731220151027; Pflanzer, supra note 148.
308. See McKenna, supra note 208 (“Theranos investor list is a who’s-who of Stanford University
alumni . . . .”).
309. In March 2019, Bloomberg reported that more than one out of ten unicorn founders went to Stanford.
Sophie Alexander & Reade Pickert, The Good and the Bad of Stanford’s Massively Successful Startup Scene,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-10/dreamers-and-dropoutsstories-from-stanford-cradle-of-unicorns; see also Larry Kim, Billion-Dollar Unicorn Founders Came from
These Universities, in Case You Were Curious, MEDIUM (Mar. 20, 2018), https://medium.com/marketing-andentrepreneurship/billion-dollar-unicorn-founders-came-from-these-universities-in-case-you-were-curious398665cc82c4 (“The top school on the list, Stanford University, claims 51 unicorn founders as alumni while
runner-up Harvard University has 37.”).
310. See Ritika Trikha, The Interdependency of Stanford and Silicon Valley, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2015,
5:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/04/what-will-stanford-be-without-silicon-valley (“In return, its
entrepreneurial alumni offer among the most generous endowments to the university, breaking the record as the
first university to add more than $1 billion in a single year. Stanford shares a relationship with Silicon Valley
unlike any other university on the planet, chartering a self-perpetuating cycle of innovation.”).
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to those who would become her advisors, investors, board members, and
employees.
Confirmation bias born out of cultural capital was a phenomenon that
played out in the media as well. In 2014, she landed a cover story with Fortune
Magazine. John Carreyrou wrote that since the author of the piece that publicly
launched her and Theranos into stardom, Roger Parloff, the writer for Fortune,
“didn’t have the expertise to vet her scientific claims, Parloff interviewed and
effectively relied on the dominant members of her Board of Directors as
character witnesses.”311
Since she was childhood friends with the daughter of billionaire venture
capitalist Tim Draper, she was able to raise her first million dollars. 312 The
investment by Tim Draper ostensibly gave her credibility for future investors.
Once other investors saw Draper’s endorsement, they were eager to invest; it did
not seem to matter that health tech venture capital firms had passed on the
venture. 313 Through tapping into the cultural capital afforded her by her
connection to Stanford, Elizabeth Holmes had a level of access to investors and
venture capital that is atypical for most startup founders in this country.314 At
the age of twenty-two, she was pitching to Novartis;315 at twenty-five, she was
pitching to the Safeway and Walgreens CEOs to develop hundred-million-dollar
deals that would put Theranos in Safeway and Walgreens stores.316 That access
to those stores then led her to use those pitches to increase the valuation of her
company to $165 million based on deals with pharmaceutical companies (note
that these deals did not actually exist).317 Theranos raised $700 million of private
investment money from 2003 to 2015.318 By 2014, the company was valued at
$9 billion, and Holmes was lauded as the first woman billionaire tech founder.319
311. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 207.
312. Id. at 15.
313. See Polina Marinova, Why VC Tim Draper Keeps Defending Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes,
FORTUNE (May 11, 2018, 7:52 AM), https://fortune.com/2018/05/11/tim-draper-theranos-elizabeth-holmes/;
Peter Cohan, How Theranos’ Big Investors Were Taken, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016, 8:23 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2016/12/01/how-theranoss-big-investors-were-taken/#4fd95c315f4f
(highlighting parallels between Bernie Madoff and Holmes in their ability to manipulate investors).
314. Major investments were made by the Walton family ($150 million), Rupert Murdoch ($121 million),
Betsy DeVos ($100 million), and the Cox family of Cox Media Group ($100 million). John Carreyrou, Theranos
Cost Business and Government Leaders More Than $600 Million, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2018, 8:01 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-cost-business-and-government-leaders-more-than-600-million1525392082.
315. See Meagan Parrish, Reliving Biotech’s Most Shocking Scandal—The Story of Theranos, PHARMA
MFG. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.pharmamanufacturing.com/articles/2019/reliving-biotechs-most-shockingscandal-the-story-of-theranos (mentioning that Holmes and Theranos executives flew to Switzerland in 2006 to
demo their technology to Novartis).
316. See id.
317. CARREYROU, supra note 16, at 182; Mitch Rencher, Bad Blood, MEDIUM (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://medium.com/@mitchrencher/bad-blood-af5b519e1045.
318. Press Release, supra note 31.
319. Kevin Loria, This Woman’s Revolutionary Idea Made Her a Billionaire—And Could Change Medicine,
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 29, 2014, 4:23 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/theranos-founder-elizabeth-holmesis-a-billionaire-2014-9.
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The list of investors in Theranos was made up of heavy hitters (for
example, the DeVos Family, Rupert Murdoch, and the Walton Family), all of
whom had heard about the investment by word of mouth.320 Elizabeth Holmes
raised hundreds of millions of dollars from investors enchanted by her pitch.
More significantly, the investors had access to the investment because their
wealthy friends and connections knew about it. If this was a good investment
opportunity, it would have made these investors a lot more money, perpetuating
circles of wealth and power, and the ordinary investors would not have had
access to the investment opportunity.
Besides perpetuating and contributing to structural privilege, the problem
with Elizabeth Holmes tapping into the cultural capital afforded to her because
of her connection to Stanford is that her company and its claims were given the
benefit of the doubt because of how class functions to reinforce perceptions of
Holmes as a mythic entrepreneur.
Startup culture’s tacit endorsement of Elizabeth Holmes was pivotal to her
success. Arguably, Holmes cultivated Theranos and her persona to conform to
startup culture and secure this endorsement. She created the company in the
heart of Silicon Valley on Stanford’s campus, and then moved offices to inhabit
Facebook’s former headquarters. She got the idea for her company while she
was at Stanford University studying biomedical engineering. In a culture where
hyping your product to get funding while also concealing its true developmental
progress and hoping reality catches up to that hype is normative and there is
private investment available in abundance to Stanford-affiliated founders of
ventures disrupting industries, it is easy to see why Holmes was able to raise so
much money so easily. Fraud and deception aside, the startup culture created by
Silicon Valley and the common methods of fundraising, the homogeneity of the
Board, groupthink, implicit bias, pattern matching, and certain opportunities that
are concentrated within an elite circle generated an environment out of which
Theranos was born.
Despite her disgrace, the capital-raising success of Elizabeth Holmes, who
created a unicorn company in ten years’ time, remains a lesson in the ways that
race, privilege, and wealth dictate startup success and perpetuates itself within
circles of power. Most entrepreneurs do not have access to the traditionally

320. See Reed Abelson & Katie Thomas, Caught in the Theranos Wreckage: Betsy DeVos, Rupert Murdoch
and Walmart’s Waltons, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/health/theranosinvestors-murdoch-devos-walmart.html; see also Peter Cohan, How Theranos’s Big Investors Were Taken,
FORBES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2016/12/01/how-theranoss-big-investorswere-taken/#24612ac45f4f (“[A] veteran medical technology investor concludes that there may be two big
reasons they agreed to invest in Theranos—it seemed to offer a compelling mission to the managers of their
family offices and they assumed that with all the luminaries associated with Theranos, someone must have done
their due diligence on its product”). Powerful and rich investors brought in their rich and powerful friends to
join in the scheme to make more money together. For example, Larry Ellison brought in his friend Don Lucas.
Sara Ashley O’Brien, Elizabeth Holmes Surrounded Theranos with Powerful People, CNN (Mar. 15, 2018, 6:43
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/15/technology/elizabeth-holmes-theranos/index.html.
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white, male networks that Holmes relied on for funding, and most investors do
not have access to the private market of pre-IPO startups.

III. ADVANCING RACIAL EQUITY AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION IN THE
STARTUP SPACE
The themes raised in this Article are informed by the racial wealth divide,
which has been created and maintained by public policies that span the history
of this country. Economic racism and the implicit bias prevalent within Silicon
Valley will not change without structural reforms to the private financial markets
system. However, a detailed discussion of policy proposals is outside of the
scope of this Article. Instead, offered below is a discussion of the necessity to
find a path forward with some ideas of areas for consideration, which fall into
the following categories: the potential of legal reform, the potential of
government programming, and the potential of private actors.
A. THE POTENTIAL OF LEGAL REFORMS
The downfall of the Theranos fraud is significant beyond the collateral
financial cost to its large investors. Theranos’ downfall had a domino effect
affecting its employees and the patients upon which the product was used. The
company’s fraud put ordinary consumers at risk, and it begs the question of what
the role should be of the government in the regulation of unicorn companies. It
is worth exploring the need for heightened regulatory oversight of certain
investment bodies, including venture capital firms or of board membership of
large, privately held companies. The private markets have demonstrated being
incapable of making changes without an intervention. If the government starts
to regulate unicorns and others who aspire to the unicorn designation, those
companies may begin to implement such strategies when they are startups rather
than waiting until they reach unicorn status. Perhaps such exploration might
reveal the need to replicate nationally some of the various state laws described
below that were implemented in an effort to diversify private company boards.
1. Federal Regulation
The SEC is already watching companies that stay private and are not
subject to extensive securities law disclosures required of public companies.321
Beyond watching the companies, it may prove useful for the government to
begin to compile and analyze data relevant to unicorn companies, which would
include data about the diversity of the companies, their boards, and their
investors.
321. See Lizetta Chapman & Kartikay Mehrotra, Investors Warn Unicorns: Share Info Evenly or Get Sued,
Bloomberg (June 13, 2016, 2:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-13/investors-warnunicorns-share-information-evenly-or-get-sued; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, SEC Warning: It Is Watching
Private Companies, D&O DIARY (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/04/articles/securitieslaws/11893/.
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2. State Regulation
Selecting board members in tech startups is an informal process where
“candidates advertise themselves [and] founders ask around . . . . And given the
demographics of Silicon Valley’s elite, it has favored white men.” 322
Diversification in board composition has been a trending topic and has been a
recent focus of the SEC as well as regulators in various states.323 Changes made
at the state level to diversify the make-up of the boards of private companies
could have potential to bring about change to the status quo. For example, the
state of California passed a new law 324 requiring that public corporations
incorporated in California or whose principal executive offices are located in
California have a mandated minimum number of female directors.325 Five other
states (Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Ohio) have passed
nonbinding resolutions urging companies in their states to add women to their
boards.326 According to the most recent report by the California Secretary of
State, around fifty percent of public companies in California are compliant with
the gender rule.327
B. THE POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
The ways that economic racism has effectively shut out communities of
color from startup investment opportunities is deeply troubling and the evidence
provided above paints a clear need for change. As illustrated above,
entrepreneurs of color are not likely to have access to capital and networks that
might yield investments. Possible solutions to consider might be the creation of
fund structures that replicate “friends and family” investments for lower-income
and lower-wealth entrepreneurs. Additionally, something worthy of
considerations are programs that formalize mechanisms to mentor and support
entrepreneurs of color.

322. Vauhini Vara, How the Boardlist Plans to Get More Women onto Startup Boards, FAST CO. (Apr. 18,
2016),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3058458/how-the-boardlist-plans-to-get-more-women-onto-startupboards.
323. See Dicker et al., supra note 159.
324. S.B. 826, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (amending California’s General Corporation Law).
The law requires that by the end of 2019, corporations must have one female director. In addition, by the end of
the 2021 calendar year, any such corporation must have a minimum of two female directors, if its number of
directors is five; or a minimum of three female directors if its number of directors is six or more. Id.
325. Id.
326. H.J.R. 17-1017, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Co. 2017); H.R. 0439, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2015); S. Res. 1007, 189th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015); H.R. 114, Gen. Assemb., 2019–2020 Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2019), H.R. 344, 131st Gen. Assemb., 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2016).
327. See SHIRLEY N. WEBER, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE, WOMEN ON BOARDS (2021),
https://bpd.cdn.sos.ca.gov/women-on-boards/wob-report-2021-02.pdf; see also Cydney Posner, California
Posts New Report on Board Gender Diversity—What Does It Tell Us?, Cooley PubCo (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://cooleypubco.com/2021/03/15/california-report-board-gender-diversity/.
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C. POTENTIAL FOR PRIVATE MARKET PARTICIPANTS
The major focus of this Article has been on the private actors who funded
Theranos and who are largely responsible for crowning unicorns. For those
individuals or companies who wish to mitigate some of what has been described
in this Article,328 I offer a few considerations: invest in founders of color, put
people of color on boards, and embrace antiracism as a guiding principle.329 In
this Article, I have situated the problem in the context of cognitive biases and
market-based incentives in Silicon Valley that have led to economic racism.
Firms and investors interested in changing the phenomenon described herein
might wish to counteract bias by evaluating their portfolios, examining the
percentages of women and founders of color-led businesses, and increasing
those numbers. They may also wish to expand and develop concrete criteria for
evaluating investment opportunities and founders in a way that moves away
from pattern matching or valuing entrepreneurs based on their pedigree,
changing their frame of reference and focusing on the opportunity. Additionally,
limited partners who invest in a particular fund of a venture capital firm could
insist on language in their respective limited partnership agreements to
encourage the venture capital firm to invest in companies led by founders of
color.

CONCLUSION
Silicon Valley, a fifty-square-mile region in the San Francisco Bay Area,
“has created more wealth than any place in human history.”330 Given the wealth
creation derived from Silicon Valley, it is hard to make a case for changing the
culture, but in the end representation matters. It is necessary to tear down the
post-racial myth of unicorns and show the places where homogeneity and lack
of diversity create and perpetuate inequity.
As of the writing of this Article, the country is in the middle of a global
pandemic, due to the spread of the coronavirus, and a racial reckoning, which
includes a racial economic reckoning for our institutions. Racial equity is tied to
economic inclusion and economic opportunity. Some of that reckoning is
happening now, or has happened relatively recently, with respect to Silicon
Valley’s prized unicorns. The Theranos trials are approaching, WeWork
unraveled most recently, and Uber has been under fire especially in the past three
to four years. In addition to that economic reckoning, the global coronavirus
328. See Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple Launches Major New Racial Equity and Justice Initiative Projects
to Challenge Systemic Racism, Advance Racial Equity Nationwide (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.apple.com/
newsroom/2021/01/apple-launches-major-new-racial-equity-and-justice-initiative-projects-to-challengesystemic-racism-advance-racial-equity-nationwide/.
329. During the 2008 Recession, companies with diverse boards and leadership performed better than less
inclusion companies. See Ed Frauenheim & Nancy Cesena, New Study Reveals That Diversity and Inclusion
May Be the Key to Beating the Next Recession, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/12/20/
diversity-inclusion-key-to-beating-next-recession/amp/.
330. Bilton, supra note 164.
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pandemic will have an effect on the issues raised in this Article. The coronavirus
crisis is compounding the deeply-entrenched inequities in our society—
inequities rooted in structural racism. Businesses owned by people of color have
been affected the most.331 In thinking about the state of entrepreneurship postpandemic, the concepts explored in this Article regarding institutional bias
should very much be front and center, particularly as ventures owned by
founders of color will be disproportionately impacted by the ongoing economic
crisis rooted in the pandemic. 332 What will be needed are real, concrete
solutions. Efforts cannot be band-aid solutions to a gaping economic wound.
The underrepresentation of people of color in the entrepreneurship
ecosystem represents the loss of a multi-billion-dollar business opportunity.333
The barriers to entry are structural and cultural for entrepreneurs of color, and
the loss is incalculable in ways that are not quantifiable. Professor Jennifer Fan
raises a prescient question: “for all the wonderful new technology and
innovations that have been brought by [technology companies], how many more
could we have had if entrepreneurs and investors came from different
backgrounds?”334 We can only imagine what innovations might have occurred
if people of color enjoyed equal access to capital and opportunity such as those
of their white counterparts.
Addressing the racial disparity in capital raising is particularly imperative
as the United States becomes a majority-minority country by 2040.335 How we
make capital available to entrepreneurs can have significant material
consequences in the market. With 82% of the industry being male, nearly 60%
of the industry being white and male, and 40% of the industry coming from just

331. In 2016, the Center for Global Policy Solutions reported that due to discriminatory financing practices
and a bias towards companies primarily operated by white males, America is losing out on over 1.1 million
minority-owned businesses. As a result, the economy is foregoing over nine million potential jobs and $300
billion in collective national income. AUSTIN, supra note 140, at 14.
332. Businesses owned by people of color are being hit the hardest by the pandemic’s health and
socioeconomic conditions. See Robert W. Fairlie, The Impact of COVID-19 on Small Business Owners: Evidence
of Early-Stage Losses from the April 2020 Current Population Survey 5, 14 tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 27309, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27309.pdf.
333. Between the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak in February and April 2020, the number of Black and
Latinx-owned businesses nationwide fell by 41% and 32% respectively, compared to just 17% of white-owned
businesses. Id.
334. Fan, supra note 65, at 352.
335. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the minority population is expected “to rise to 56 percent of the
total population in 2060, compared with 38 percent in 2014.” Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, New Census
Bureau Report Analyzes U.S. Population Projections (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2015/cb15-tps16.html. That growth, coupled with the fact that minority-owned businesses have
increased to comprise more than fifty percent of new businesses started in the United States over the last decade,
means that the future economic growth of the United States will include this group. See Minority Entrepreneurs,
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
minorityentrepreneurs (last visited May 21, 2021). Business policies and investments will need to be much more
diverse than they are not to support the United States as an economic leader and driver in a global economy.
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two academic institutions, 336 the culture needs to be less insular and more
diverse.
The story of Elizabeth Holmes could not be a more intriguing story. The
massive fraud and the drama around the inner workings of the company make
for great entertainment. 337 But fraud and deception have happened before in
Silicon Valley and it is certainly likely to happen again.338 While the SEC and
the federal courts will deal with Elizabeth Holmes and Sunny Balwani as the
source of the fraud, how the structures in place and the culture of pursuing
unicorn status at all costs contribute to and enable fraud and deception should
also be examined. The stories around startup culture and the private investment
market and the structural bias inherent therein converge in the figure of Holmes
and her failed startup, Theranos, as a cautionary tale. The massive fraud by
Theranos appears to be an outlier, but its implications are vast. As startups and
their investors seek to model themselves after and replicate the successes of past
unicorn companies and their founders, it is worth examining, and indeed,
changing the culture of the startup ecosystem. There remains a lot of work to do
to make entrepreneurship more equitable.

336. Kerby, supra note 280.
337. In May 2018, John Carreyrou released the book Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup.
CARREYROU, supra note 16. As of June 2018, a film version was in the works starring Hollywood film Jennifer
Lawrence as Elizabeth Holmes. Dana Rose Falcone, Everything to Know About the Elizabeth Holmes Movie
Starring Jennifer Lawrence, PEOPLE (Mar. 22, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://people.com/movies/elizabeth-holmestheranos-jennifer-lawrence-movie/. In January 2019, ABC News Nightline released a podcast and documentary
about the Holmes story called The Dropout, and HBO released the documentary The Inventor: Out for Blood in
Silicon Valley about Holmes and Theranos, which made its official debut at the Sundance Film Festival in Park
City, Utah, on January 24, 2019. See ABC News, The Dropout (Jan. 15, 2019) (downloaded using iTunes); The
Inventor: Out for Blood in Silicon Valley, supra note 24.
338. See 16 of the Biggest Alleged Startup Frauds of All Time, CB INSIGHTS (May 23, 2019),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/biggest-startup-frauds (“There’s almost always an element of ‘fake it ’till
you make it’ for a successful, disruptive startup. Some companies just push their luck a little too far. When that’s
happened, some companies survive. Others are forced to rebrand in an attempt to distance themselves from the
notoriety of their founders. And others disappear forever.”).
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